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1 
REVISITING THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON 







 It is generally believed that the judicial review of agency 
rulemakings helps protect the public interest against industry 
capture. Yet very little empirical research has been done to assess 
the accuracy of this conventional wisdom. This study examines the 
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entire set of air toxic emission regulations promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with particular attention 
to those rules appealed to judgment in the court of appeals, and 
discovers significant disconnects between popular understanding 
of judicial review and rule-making reality. Of these air toxic rules 
(N=90), the courts were summoned to review only a small fraction 
(8%), despite evidence that many air toxic rules may have 
problems, at least from the public interest perspective. Moreover, 
although virtually all of the litigation brought by public interest 
groups against the EPA’s air toxic rules was successful, the 
resulting victories have not yet had much impact in practice. For 
most of its vacated regulations, the EPA has either ignored or 
limited the courts’ opinions and has not re-promulgated revised 
rules. Thus, while the tenor of the opinions seems to re-affirm the 
courts’ role as guardian of the public interest, the actual impact of 
these opinions on agency practice may be less influential than one 
might expect. A concluding section takes the analysis one step 
further and explores the possibility that the net effect of judicial 
review may actually be more perverse.  The ability of the dominant 
parties (which in the case of EPA’s air toxic rules is regulated 
industry) to threaten the agency with expensive and time-
consuming litigation could provide these groups with legal 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999817
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leverage that, in the aggregate serves to further undermine the 
agency’s ability to act on behalf of the public interest.  
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 The judicial expansion of standing in the 1970s radically 
altered administrative process. A legal system available only to 
regulated industries seeking to protect their narrow interests 
against agency abuse1 was transformed into a process that 
allowed all affected parties, including public interest groups, to 
challenge agency rules in court.2 The risk that the agency could 
now be sued by all affected parties, rather than just by regulated 
interests, was expected to cause agencies to be both more 
solicitous of and more receptive to the views of all stakeholders.3 
Equally beneficial, when an agency did ignore stakeholder input, 
the agency could be forced to explain its decision to the courts.4 
This new, broader form of judicial review was expected to play a 
particularly important institutional check against capture by 
regulated parties.5 
 Although there is vigorous debate about whether this 
pluralistic model—initially dubbed the “interest group 
representation model”—is the best one for administrative 
process,6 there seems to be tacit agreement among commentators 
                                                 
1.See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669-70 (1975). Professor Stewart calls this older model of judicial 
review the “traditional model,” in which only regulated parties are able to seek judicial 
review of agency actions to protect their economic interests. Id. (“The traditional model ... 
has sought to reconcile the competing claims of governmental authority and private 
autonomy by prohibiting official intrusions on private liberty or property unless 
authorized by legislative directives.”). 
2.See id. at 1723 (“The transformation of the traditional model into a model of interest 
representation has in large degree been achieved through an expansion of the class of 
interests entitled to seek judicial review of agency action.”). 
3.See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (describing how this liberalized standing and expanded judicial 
review attempted to root out industry capture of agency officials by regulated parties). 
4.See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring 
Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 695 (2000). 
5.See, e.g., Merrill, supra note , at 1043. 
6.See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the 
Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4/ (discussing various problems associated with the 
interest group representation model) (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); Mark Seidenfeld, The 
Quixotic Quest for a “Unified” Theory of the Administrative State, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, 14-15 (2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2/ (discussing other 
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that this model generally describes what occurs on the ground.7 
Yet central features of the pluralistic model remain 
unsubstantiated as an empirical matter.8 In order for the model 
to provide an even partly accurate description of rule-making 
processes, for example, a diverse set of interests must regularly 
engage with the agency in ways that can be backed by an appeal 
if the agency ignores those interests. When a court reviews an 
agency’s rule at the behest of stakeholders, moreover, the court’s 
opinion should have some impact on the agency’s future decision 
making. If these assumptions do not pan out in administrative 
reality, then the current model of administrative process may 
need some reexamination.  
 Growing evidence suggests, in fact, that administrative 
practice may be quite different from what conventional wisdom 
supposes. Several different empirical studies that examined 
regulations over the last five years have identified a distinct “bias 
towards business” running through rules promulgated by several 
different regulatory agencies; a bias that should not exist if 
pluralistic engines are running effectively.9 One of the leading 
                                                                                                                 
normative visions that could replace the interest group model and concluding that no 
“unified” theory will likely emerge) (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).  
7.See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 45-54 (1988) (describing the pluralistic and post-pluralistic models of 
judicial review, both of which depend on a constellation of diverse interest groups to 
engage with and ultimately sue the agencies); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and 
Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
599, 609 (2004) (“Few believe that agencies are, in the terminology of Richard Stewart, 
writing a quarter century ago, mere ‘transmission belts’ for interest group influences”; 
instead, most view agency decision processes as involving some form of pluralistic 
microbargaining.); M. Elizabeth Magill, Images of Representation, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, 2 (2005), http://www.bepress. com/ils/iss6/art5/ (“To say that representation 
of those affected by governance is a theme running through many schools of thought is not 
to say that we have a neatly worked out theory of interest representation. Far from it.”) 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012). The earliest incarnation of the pluralistic model—the interest 
group representation model—morphed into subsequent variations that still relied on a 
diverse set of stakeholders to bring the claims, but these variations involved less judicial 
activism, particularly on the public interest side. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 707, 
714-15 (describing a counterreformation in the 1980s that remains tethered to a basic 
pluralistic model of oversight but differs on the level of judicial scrutiny).  
8.See infra Part III. 
9.See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? 
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128 (2006) 
(identifying a “bias towards business”); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: 
An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 3 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 125 
(2011). 
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explanatory factors for this tilt in influence is the fact of judicial 
review itself. To the extent that each comment serves as a 
placeholder for litigation, influence corresponds to the number of 
forceful commenters: badly imbalanced stakeholder input into 
rules may lead to imbalanced outputs because of, not in spite of, 
judicial review.10 Additionally, evidence of agency 
nonacquiescence—an action by an agency that simply rejects or 
ignores adverse court precedent—calls into question whether the 
courts’ direct interventions really do change the agencies’ decision 
making. If agencies are not terribly worried about adverse court 
rulings, then this fact too alters how one understands the impact 
of judicial review on the rulemaking process.11  
 Given this preliminary evidence that calls into question 
whether the pluralistic model accurately describes what is going 
on in practice, there is reason to want to learn more. This study 
begins the effort by examining the agency-court-interest group 
interactions in an entire set of air toxic emission standards 
promulgated under the Clean Air Act by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).12 These standards affect public health 
directly, but data show that the rules receive far greater input 
from industry than from public interest groups.13 In such a 
skewed participatory regime, the courts’ role as guardian of the 
public interest becomes particularly important. In an effort to 
study judicial review’s capacity to protect the public interest, the 
study examines the litigated air toxic rules and sets these rules 
against the interest group-agency interactions occurring in the 
larger set of ninety air toxic standards promulgated by the EPA.14 
 The findings reveal that interactions between interest groups, 
agencies, and the courts do not always operate as expected. In a 
small number of rules, public interest appeals powerfully 
highlight ways that the agency violated basic statutory terms in 
its development of air toxic emission standards, just as the 
interest group representation model predicted.15 Surprisingly, 
however, the courts’ precedent and remands do not appear to 
                                                 
10.See infra Part III.C. 
11.See infra Part III.B.2. 
12.See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006) (outlining these emission standards for air toxics). 
13.See infra Appendix 2; see also Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 132 (discussing this 
finding in a related study). 
14.See infra Part II. 
15.See infra Part III.A.1. 
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exert much of an impact on agency decision making and in some 
cases seem to be effectively ignored.16 The data also expose stark 
imbalances in interest group engagement across rules, which, in 
turn, suggest that the courts are not always on hand to enforce 
the interests of all affected parties.17 Although some of the EPA 
rules are subject to pluralistic bargaining that matches what 
seems to be imagined by the interest group representation model, 
the majority do not.18 Instead, the bulk of the rules are 
hammered out between regulated interests and agency officials 
with no input from other groups—a type of regulatory oversight 
that seems more akin to the defunct, traditional model than to its 
more modern replacement.19 
 The possibility that judicial review inadvertently causes 
advantaged groups to enjoy even greater legal leverage in a large 
subset of rulemakings, while providing only limited oversight of 
agency decisions in a smaller subset of rules, is supported in four 
Parts. The first Part considers the basic literature surrounding 
judicial review and explores some of the basic empirical 
assumptions underlying the current pluralistic model of judicial 
review. The second Part provides an overview of the study and 
explains the methods used in this study. The empirical findings 
from the research are discussed in the third Part. Finally, the 
fourth Part considers what the findings suggest about 
conventional understandings of the impact of judicial review on 
agency rulemakings, particularly with respect to the courts’ role 
in advancing the public interest. 
 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKINGS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
 
 Judicial review is considered a critical institutional mechanism 
for holding agencies accountable to all affected parties, including 
the broader public. In its most idealized form, judicial review 
serves as an institutional check to ensure that agencies provide 
information to interested parties, take parties’ input seriously, 
and in the end provide cogent and accessible explanations for 
                                                 
16.See infra Part III.B.1. 
17.See infra Part III.A.2. 
18.See infra Part IV.B. 
19.See infra Part IV.B. 
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their decisions, thus allowing the political process to engage in 
oversight of these otherwise obscure bureaucratic decisions.20 
Judicial review also ensures that the agencies stay within 
reasonable bounds in their interpretation of statutory directives; 
without the courts policing these statutory edges, lawlessness 
could result.21 Liberalized standing rules, coupled with relatively 
accessible and low cost access to the courts for stakeholders, allow 
interest groups of all sizes and resource levels to challenge unfair 
rules and raise them for public scrutiny.22 This is particularly 
important for complex rules that otherwise might be badly 
skewed in favor of regulated parties.23 Cases such as Citizens To 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe stand as a testament to the 
ability of local community organizations and citizen activists to 
hold Washington bureaucrats accountable when they ignore the 
law.24 
 Despite the vital institutional role that courts play in the 
administrative state, there has been a dearth of investigation into 
what is actually occurring at the agency-court interface in 
                                                 
20.See, e.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 641 (1997) (“Having to 
conform to the authorizing statute, requisite procedures, and reasoned elaboration 
requirements can temper tendencies toward arbitrariness, special interest deals, or other 
behaviors in tension with an agency’s overt statutory mission.”). Nearly 40% of the 
vacaturs of agency regulations apparently occur because the agency failed to adequately 
explain or document its reasoning. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time 
of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 665 (1997). 
21.See generally Sargentich, supra note , at 634 (“Active judicial review can help to deter 
the worst abuses of power and to give staff inside an agency levers with which to bargain 
in the development of policy that serves statutory aims.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985) (touting value of judicial 
review to combat capture-like problems that might otherwise afflict agencies). 
22.See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note , at 51 (describing this pluralistic grounding of judicial 
review and also the hope that, rather than advancing only narrow interests, some groups 
will “push for the right rather than their own particular interests”); Stewart, supra note , 
at 1755 (“By affording all affected interests with a recognized stake in agency policy the 
right to demand and participate in such procedures ... [the courts] facilitate effective 
judicial review of asserted agency laxity or bias.”). 
23.Cf. William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY 
595, 607-08 (1986) (providing a two-by-two chart that identifies rules with low salience 
and high complexity as subject to imbalanced oversight that will generally tip in favor of 
regulated parties). 
24.401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (holding that citizen group had standing to challenge 
Department of Transportation’s failure to comply with statutory requirements governing 
disbursement of federal highway transportation funds to construct a highway through a 
park), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
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practice.25 Professor Mashaw warns that as a result of this gap 
between theory and empirical knowledge about the impact of 
judicial review, “[d]octrinal discussions ... [may ultimately] seem 
like cartoons when laid beside the occasional empirical 
investigation of agency operation.”26 
 This Section lays out the promise of judicial review in theory 
and highlights some of the unanswered questions regarding its 
operation in practice. 
 
A. Basics of Judicial Review 
 
 Although the scrutiny courts give to agency rules has ebbed 
and flowed over time, the underlying principle that the courts 
stand as a check on agency discretion has remained a constant 
theme over the last seven decades.27 The courts accomplish this 
oversight in large part by reviewing challenges to agency 
rulemakings and other actions.28 In most settings, virtually any 
affected party can challenge a problematic rule and ask the court 
to determine whether the rulemaking is arbitrary or otherwise 
out of line with the authorizing statute.29 In this way, the agency 
confronts limits to its discretion that are enforced by interested 
parties and adjudicated by disinterested generalist judges. 
                                                 
25.See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 125-33 (2008) 
(discussing various methodological and data barriers to studying the administrative 
process and outlining the limited empirical research that is available); ROBERT J. HUME, 
HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 2-3 (2009) (referencing the 
need for better empirical understanding of how agencies respond to courts and focusing his 
study on agency responses to “opinion language”); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile 
Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1245-47 (1999) (arguing that 
the “existence of authority for courts to review agency rulemaking is broadly presumed” 
and lacks rigorous theoretical and empirical support); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, 
and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 
57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 536 (2005) (“[W]e now know very little about agency interpretive 
practice.”). 
26.Mashaw, supra note , at 536. 
27.See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 17-19, 21-26 (7th ed. 2011) (describing administrative law’s 
chronological development, which highlights the importance of judicial review in the 
contemporary evolution of administrative law). 
28.See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
29.Standing is a legally complicated concept, but in most informal rulemakings the 
affected parties—with a little foresight—can participate in ways that assure they will 
have standing to file an appeal if they should so desire. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE 
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.4, at 139-71 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the 
law of standing in administrative law). 
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 Initially, in the 1940s when the Administrative Procedure Act 
was first passed,30 the courts’ role was oriented primarily toward 
protecting the interests of regulated parties against arbitrary 
agency action (the traditional model),31 but with the rise of social 
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts’ role shifted to 
become much more focused on serving as a critical counterforce to 
agency capture.32 Apparently motivated by a sense that agencies 
would benefit from greater public interest-oriented oversight, the 
courts, acting on their own volition, liberalized standing rules to 
allow any aggrieved party to challenge arbitrary agency action.33 
Expanded standing was followed soon after by the courts’ 
increasingly aggressive scrutiny of agency rules and analyses.34 
Some courts even gave a “hard look” to agency rules to ensure 
that the agency had documented its fact-finding, explained its 
logic, and duly considered all contrary evidence.35 Growing 
indications of the special interest capture of agencies convinced 
some judges that too much deference to agency experts would 
systematically allow agencies to lean too far in the direction of 
regulated parties.36 These cumulative developments—both 
broader standing and a harder look at agency rules—led to the 
reformation of administrative law, transforming the courts’ role 
from the guarantor of narrow, due-process protections, which 
were available only to regulated parties, to the full-scale 
institutional gatekeeper that holds agencies accountable to the 
public at large.37 
                                                 
30.Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
31.See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
32.See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
33.See, e.g., Stewart, supra note , at 1715-16 (spotlighting “the expansion of standing to 
seek judicial review of agency action” as one of the central elements in the transformation 
of the traditional model of administrative law with respect to agency ru1emakings). 
34.See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(“What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when 
his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course 
rather than another.”). 
35.For a critical assessment of the hard look doctrine, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 593-97 (5th ed. 2010). 
36.See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Courts and Agencies, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 89, 
93-94 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004) (describing the courts’ concern about 
possible industry capture). 
37.See, e.g., Stewart, supra note , at 1758 (“[T]he requirement that agencies give adequate 
consideration to all affected interests, and in particular, the interests of the intended 
12                   WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW          [Vol. 53:000 
 
 During this early reformation period, public interest groups 
seemed to emerge from the woodwork to defend the rights of the 
diffuse public against capture and other lapses in agency 
judgment.38 Indeed, the prevalence of these groups—although 
seemingly defying collective action theory—led analysts to 
celebrate the resulting “interest group representation” model and 
the pluralistic transformation of administrative law.39 Professor 
James Q. Wilson, for example, observes how the “EPA has had to 
deal with as many complaints and lawsuits from 
environmentalists as from industry, despite the economic and 
political advantages industry presumably enjoys.”40 In their study 
of interest group politics, Professors Loomis and Cigler conclude 
that by the early 1980s a “participation revolution” had arisen 
comprising citizens and special interest groups seeking “collective 
material benefits” for the public at large.41 Professor Bosso 
observes in his study of pesticide politics that “[b]y the mid-1980s, 
... we find a diversity in representation that, on the surface at 
least, gives pluralists some vindication.”42 The possibility that at 
some point in the future, public interest groups might not be able 
to keep up with regulated parties seemed unlikely in light of the 
unexpected abundance of public watchdogs. Most of the concerns 
about the representative capacity of the public interest groups 
were instead preoccupied with the possibility that these public 
interest groups would advance goals that were not fully 
representative of or might even be in conflict with the diffuse 
public.43 There were also concerns that the resulting great waves 
                                                                                                                 
beneficiaries of an administrative scheme, has been utilized by the courts with increasing 
frequency to redress perceived agency favoritism to organized interests.”). 
38.See Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, The Changing Nature of Interest Group 
Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 10-11 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 
7th ed. 2007). 
39.See Stewart, supra note , at 1760-61. 
40.James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 385 
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). 
41.Loomis & Cigler, supra note 38, at 11.  
42.CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 
245 (1987). This is in part because “[e]nvironmental policies, by their nature, prompt acrid 
disputes among equally determined and almost permanently mobilized sets of claimants 
because they exhibit structures of incentives more contagious to conflict than do 
agricultural subsidies or water projects.” Id. at 252. 
43.See, e.g., Stewart, supra note , at 1764-70 (discussing problems that flow from the fact 
that “‘[p]ublic interest’ advocates ... do not represent—and do not claim to represent—the 
interests of the community as a whole”). Although Professor Stewart does highlight the 
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of diverse pluralistic oversight might be too cumbersome and 
resource intensive for the agencies to manage.44 
 The view of courts as the last bastions against agency capture 
subsided somewhat in the 1980s and beyond.45 After more than a 
decade of experience, there were concerns that the courts’ review 
actually produced unintended side effects that might cause 
aggressive review to become more of a problem than a solution. 
For example, some scholars worried that “hard look” review could 
paralyze an agency, which in turn would lead to substantial 
delays in regulation writing and a general ossification of the rule-
making process.46 Some prominent commenters, including 
members of the judiciary, also became concerned that public 
interest challenges that purported to represent the broader 
interests of the diffuse public focused the agency on trivial risks 
at the expense of more important economic and environmental 
priorities.47 Both of these perspectives counseled for more, not 
less, deference to agency decisions.48 Finally, a series of empirical 
studies revealed statistically significant correlations between 
court of appeals rulings and the ideological bent of the judicial 
                                                                                                                 
likelihood that resources of these fragmented groups will not allow them to provide 
“adequate representation of all those interests significantly affected by agency decisions,” 
id. at 1764, he does not elaborate on how the complete absence of such representatives will 
lead to a model that is so different from the traditional model. His attention instead turns 
to the enormous discretion the groups enjoy with respect to prioritizing issues of interest 
to the general public. Id.  
44.One of Stewart’s primary concerns with the interest group representation model was 
not whether it would be utilized by a diverse constituency as much as that it would be 
used by so many diverse interests that the development of uniform rules of decision by the 
courts would become effectively impossible. See, e.g., id. at 1778-79 (expressing concern 
about how court rulings might resist “regular ordering” and therefore lack coherent 
criteria for resolution). 
45.See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1041 (describing a “significant retrenchment” from 
the judicial activity that characterized the pre-1983 period to post-1983 activity that 
provided agencies with greater deference). 
46.See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-14 (1992) (detailing concerns that hard look review could 
effectively paralyze agency rulemakings). 
47.See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 33, 50-51 (1993) (describing how public perceptions trigger a “vicious circle” 
of legislation and regulation of trivial risks that imposes unjustified costs on regulated 
parties); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 741-43 (1999) (discussing how salient and accessible claims about 
environmental risks can cascade to unsupported urgent calls for regulation of trivial 
risks). 
48.See, e.g., McGarity, supra note , at 1451-54. 
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panel.49 This potential partisan bias in the courts’ review of 
agency rules also counseled for greater deference to agencies 
given the political qualities of much agency decision making.50 
 Although the role of the courts in advancing the public interest 
has become less aggressive since the early 1970s, the image of 
courts as public guardians nevertheless persists.51 Much of the 
contemporary commentary on the role of the courts understands 
that courts serve as an important, institutional counterforce to 
the powerful, heavily invested industries that pressure the 
agency throughout the rule-making process.52 Whether the courts 
scrutinize the agency’s decision closely or distantly and at arm’s 
length, the objective of providing some check on agency power is a 
continuous theme.53  
 
B. Unreviewed Assumptions 
 
 Lurking behind this conceptualization of the courts as 
guardians of the public interest are basic, yet largely unasked 
and unanswered, questions about how agencies and courts 
actually behave.54 
 For example, the pluralistic or interest group representation 
model, by its terms, depends on a sufficient number of public 
                                                 
49.See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 88-90 (2011) (summarizing the empirical study of 
partisan bias in appellate panels in their review of agency rulemakings). 
50.See, e.g., Cross, supra note , at 1269-76, 1301-06, 1309-13 (discussing evidence of 
ideological bias in appellate court decisions and discussing the implications for judicial 
review); Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 CONST. 
COMMENT. 375, 387 (1988) (noting how the dialogic justification for the courts depends on 
the neutrality of the judiciary). 
51.See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note , at 642 (“[T]he courts are the major national 
institutions designed to uphold law-governed limits on agency discretion, to protect 
individual rights, and to review executive power in the name of checks and balances.”); see 
also supra note 7. 
52.See, e.g., Merrill, supra note , at 1043; Sargentich, supra note , at 641. 
53.See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note , at 642 (arguing that benefits of judicial review 
outweigh the costs). But see Cross, supra note , at 1281-90 (identifying and criticizing this 
key assumption that courts are an essential mechanism for checking agency action). 
54.See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A 
Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 
893 (2007) (“It seems to me not only odd, but perverse, that articles parsing the exquisite 
subtleties of Chevron or Skidmore deference fill our law reviews, while virtually nothing is 
said about the ways in which agencies should and do interpret the statutes in their 
charge.” (citation omitted)). 
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interest groups to at least threaten, if not use, liberalized 
standing rules to check agency abuses of discretion. In Professor 
Stewart’s words, “the transformation of the traditional model into 
a model of interest representation has in large degree been 
achieved through an expansion of the class of interests entitled to 
seek judicial review of agency action.”55 But if these groups are 
wholly absent from the rule-making process despite liberalized 
standing and the relevance of the rules to the broader public 
interest,56 it is difficult to understand how the resulting approach 
to administrative oversight will be much different from the 
traditional due-process model that preceded the reformation.  
Growing evidence of imbalances in the use of the notice-and-
comment process by affected interest groups for publicly 
important rules in fact provides reason to be concerned that all 
affected groups may not have equal access to the courts.57 
 Administrative law scholarship also offers several grounds for 
concern that the agencies may not always comply with judicially 
imposed directives.58 A sizable body of nonacquiescence 
literature, for example, suggests that agencies actually are quite 
bold about explicitly rejecting judicial precedent,59 even in 
intracircuit situations when court rules are otherwise 
controlling.60 More subtle forms of nonacquiescence that do not 
                                                 
55.Stewart, supra note , at 1723. 
56.The relevance of these rules to the broader public interest is discussed below. See infra 
notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
57.See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note , at 131, 133 (studying forty lower-salience 
rulemakings promulgated by four different federal agencies and finding that business 
interests submitted 57% of comments, whereas nonbusiness or nongovernmental 
organizations submitted 22% of comments, of which 6% came from public interest groups). 
58.See generally HUME, supra note , at 36-37 (discussing the courts’ limited ability to 
oversee compliance with their remedies). 
59.See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681-84 (1989) (describing the nonacquiescence 
phenomenon in detail); Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial 
Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664, 1664-66 (1993) (discussing nonacquiescence in 
general and, in particular, the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) nonacquiescence 
in Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); Nancy M. Modesitt, The 
Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right To 
Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949, 961-62 & n.79 (2009) (reporting evidence of 
agency nonacquiescence in more recent years). 
60.See, e.g., Estreicher & Revsesz, supra note 58, at 743-53 (discussing intracircuit 
acquiescence in detail). For other specific accounts of agency nonacquiescence in more 
recent years, see Modesitt, supra note , at 973-79 (describing nonacquiescence by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Kevin Haskins, Note, A “Delicate Balance”: 
How Agency Nonacquiescence and the EPA’s Water Transfer Rule Dilute the Clean Water 
16                   WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW          [Vol. 53:000 
 
involve explicit rejections of adverse precedent, but instead 
involve agency interpretations that distinguish precedent in 
creative ways, seem even more likely to be used by an agency 
eager to protect its turf from judicial encroachment.61 And in 
some settings there is even evidence that agencies avoid informal 
rulemakings altogether in order to avoid the risk of a court 
challenge.62 
 Basic models of institutional design remind us that 
unexamined assumptions can sometimes cause an overarching, 
institutional goal—like ensuring pluralistic oversight of agency 
discretion—to move backward rather than forward if the facts 
diverge from what is assumed.63 For example, if it turns out that 
judicial review is not used by public interest groups in many 
public-benefitting areas, then rather than advancing the public 
                                                                                                                 
Act After Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 60 ME. 
L. REV. 173, 174-76 (2008) (describing the EPA’s nonacquiescence to precedent in defining 
water transfer rules). 
61.In their study of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) response to 
judicial commands during the 1980s, for example, Professors DeShazo and Freeman 
outline how FERC essentially behaved as if the adverse precedent that limited its 
discretion had never happened. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as 
Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2247 (2005) (“One would think that such high profile 
lawsuits would have prompted FERC to modify its behavior, even if Congress and the 
executive branch had remained largely propower in their oversight. But FERC initially 
acted as if Scenic Hudson [the 1965 Second Circuit case] had never happened. And it 
continued to drag its feet throughout the ’70s as the adverse decisions mounted.”). 
62.See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case 
of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273-74 (1987) (discussing how judicial 
review has caused NHTSA to avoid rulemaking in favor of recalls); Peter H. Schuck, When 
the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy 
Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 165-68, 194-98 (discussing how the 
procedural obstacles posed primarily by judicial review and executive order led the 
Department of Energy to abandon policymaking through rulemaking in favor of 
policymaking through individual adjudications by an office authorized to make special 
exceptions to existing rules); see also Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and 
Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 389-90 (describing how courts drive rulemaking 
underground); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of 
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166-67 (2000) (same). 
63.The theory of second best, for example, warns that imperfections in the real world that 
are not accounted for in efforts to move a system towards greater economic efficiency could 
actually cause reform efforts to have the opposite impact on efficiency. For an overview of 
the theory, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS: ON THE DEFINITION, 
PREDICTION, AND RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 76-77 (2008). There are likely 
many critical, fact-based assumptions embedded in the interest group representation 
model of judicial review, as well as other models, such as the traditional model. The fact-
based questions explored in this study are likely to be the tip of the iceberg in this respect. 
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interest, judicial review may be hijacked by regulated industry 
and used as a brickbat to keep the agencies in line.  
 Similarly, agencies face a number of other pressures and 
sources of influence beyond judicial review.64 Although the courts 
undoubtedly impact agency choices,65 it is not clear that the 
courts’ interpretations of an agency’s regulatory authority 
constrain agency decision making in all, or even the majority of 
rulemakings.66 Perhaps it is better to risk a remand or vacatur, 
for example, than to anger an influential constituent or to find 
oneself crosswise with the Chief Executive.67 Yet if the agencies 
do not generally treat court reprimands as hard constraints on 
their authority, then the benefits of judicial review will be greatly 
diminished.68  
 Additionally, the toll that judicial review takes on the agency’s 
workload, particularly through the opportunity costs and drains 
from other, even more important projects,69 remains only partly 
understood; yet again, the downsides that result could well 
exceed the benefits of judicial review in advancing the public 
interest. 
 Although there are a number of interesting and useful 
empirical questions about the court-agency-interest group 
interface in the current pluralistic model of judicial review, this 
Study focuses on three questions in particular: 
 1. Does equal access to the courts exist in practice? The 
effectiveness of court oversight depends on a relatively rigorous 
                                                 
64.See infra notes 187-208 and accompanying text. 
65.See Stewart, supra note , at 1758 (describing how courts have attempted to curb agency 
favoritism). 
66.See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note , at 890-91 (noting that despite its emphasis on Chevron, 
the EPA “base[s] much of their agency interpretation on past agency practice, technical or 
scientific understandings of statutory terms, and on legislative history”). 
67.See id. at 891 (“[I]t seems normatively appropriate for agencies to give significant 
deference to presidential directions concerning how they should interpret their statutes.”). 
68.Professor Mashaw has noted the court-centeredness of most work on judicial review, 
which almost totally misses the agency side of the partnership. See, e.g., id. at 891-93 
(arguing for greater study of agency practice). For example, while considerable effort is 
dedicated to getting the deference standard right, there remains very little assurance that 
the agency will respond in a straightforward way to these judicial instructions. See id. at 
893. 
69.See Cross, supra note , at 1280-81 (“Judicial review may also hinder the ability of 
agencies to set a sensible regulatory agenda, may ignore political and practical constraints 
on agency action, and may systematically produce rules of poorer quality.”). 
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use of the courts by a wide range of affected interests.70 If those 
most aggrieved by lapses in agency judgments are not engaging 
in the rulemaking or are not able to file appeals, then the benefits 
of judicial review are diminished and in some policy areas could 
become negative if courts are used primarily by the already-
empowered groups, like regulated parties.71 This is in fact quite 
possible, because many of the representatives of the diffuse public 
have limited resources and may not be able to engage in notice 
and comment, much less appeal the rules to the courts.72 
Whatever the case, the effectiveness of courts as overseers seems 
to depend on the ability of the full range of affected parties to use 
them.  
 2. How does the agency react to judicial decisions? Even if 
public interest groups are not engaged in all or even most rules, 
the court precedent that emerges from the appeals can constrain 
agency practice.73 The effectiveness of the courts thus also 
assumes that the agencies will respond to judicial opinions.74 If 
agencies are inclined to ignore court rulings, however, then the 
effectiveness of judicial review may be much more limited. 
 3. Does the ever-looming threat of judicial review also operate to 
undermine advancement of the public interest, however 
unintended? The literature on ossification, as well as the costs of 
judicial activism documented by Dr. Melnick several decades 
                                                 
70.See Stewart, supra note , at 1760-61, 1763. 
71.Although the possibility of insufficient public interest group engagement seemed not to 
be on the political or cultural horizon at the time that Professor Stewart wrote his classic 
article, he nevertheless identifies the importance of this representation in order to make 
the interest group model work. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. For 
example, he notes, without elaboration, that in the interest group representation model, 
“the problem of administrative procedure is to provide representation for all affected 
interests.” Stewart, supra note , at 1759; see also id. at 1763-64 (“Broad participation 
rights do not, by any means, ensure that all relevant interests will be represented before 
the agencies.”). Stewart then suggests that public interest groups will generally be on 
hand to represent the diffuse public, however incompletely, in many rule-making settings. 
Id. at 1763, 1767-68 (rejecting the need for subsidizing public interest groups, presumably 
because such subsidies are not needed to ensure their engagement in most settings). 
72.See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-85 (2006) (discussing the limited resources of the 
public in comparison to narrow interest groups). 
73.See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 494 (2002). 
74.See, e.g., id. at 547-48 (drawing a cautious but optimistic portrait, based on the larger 
psychological literature, of how agencies are likely to respond rationally and favorably to 
judicial review commands). 
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ago,75 attest to the possibility of some unintended side effects 
associated with judicial review that adversely affect the public 
interest.76 Yet the extent to which these and other unintended 
effects of judicial review actually undermine the courts’ ability to 
advance the public interest is poorly understood.77 This type of 
grounded inquiry of the downsides of judicial review would seem 
a critical component in evaluating competing doctrinal 
approaches and measuring the value of judicial review itself.78 
 Gaining a more comprehensive understanding of how an 
agency interacts with the courts is bound to improve both 
administrative theory and practice. If judicial review is used 
primarily by one sector, for example, then doctrinal tests might 
need to be recalibrated to correct that imbalance by, for example, 
altering agency or interest group incentives to participate or to 
appeal problematic rules.79 Whatever the case, an empirically 
grounded understanding of agency-court-interest group 
interactions provides useful information in evaluating the design 
of administrative process.  
 
II. THE STUDY 
 
                                                 
75.See B. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
343-45 (1983) (highlighting “unintended and undesirable consequences of court action”). 
76.See, e.g., McGarity, supra note , at 1419-20, 1426 (arguing that the costs associated 
with judicial review will cause agency decision makers to “be reluctant to undertake new 
rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory techniques, and to 
revisit old rulemaking efforts”). 
77.Currently, empirical research on the unintended side effects seems to focus primarily 
on whether ossification actually exists. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification 
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency 
Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
393, 396 (2000) (“[J]udicial review in the D.C. Circuit under the hard look version of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard generally did not significantly impede agencies in the 
pursuit of their policy goals during the decade [from 1985 to 1995].”); Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern 
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 923 (2008) (challenging claims of ossification and 
highlighting the effects of political cycles, particularly congressional cycles, on rule-
making activity). 
78.See generally Cross, supra note , at 1244-47 (making this point before rejecting 
individual justifications for judicial review of agency rules). 
79.See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1406-09, 1416 (2010) (offering this type of preliminary 
proposal). 
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 This Study examines the agency-court-interest group 
interaction occurring in the EPA’s air toxic emission rules, a set 
of regulations that presents a best, or at least a better case for 
exposing constructive relationships between these three sets of 
actors. With respect to interest group participation, these rules 
regulate air toxic emissions from major industrial facilities and 
thus have significant consequences for public health.80 So, in the 
abstract, they would seem likely to generate considerable interest 
from the public interest and grassroots communities.81 On the 
agency side, the EPA purports to be generally responsive to court 
rulings82 and is generally viewed as biased in favor of the public 
interest, at least in comparison to other agencies.83 These 
qualities again would seem to make the EPA’s rules more 
sensitive to the demands of the public interest groups and 
responsive to the commands of the courts that rule favorably for 
public interest groups. Finally, on the court side, Congress vests 
challenges to the air toxic rules exclusively with the D.C. 
Circuit,84 which is widely considered the premier circuit for the 
review of complex agency rules.85 Together, these characteristics 
of the air toxic rules provide a good basis for testing the 
hypothesis that the courts are critical to ensuring agency 
                                                 
80.See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots, 
and the Prospect of Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1445, 1445, 1449-52 (2008) (describing the pivotal role of air toxics in reducing health 
risks and the resultant inadequacies in their enforcement). 
81.See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text. 
82.See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 96 (interviewing an EPA official who reported that “[i]t 
is very rare that EPA would nonacquiesce”); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note , at 717 
(describing the EPA’s policy to accept adverse decisions in individual circuits and to 
refrain from relitigating them). 
83.See, e.g., Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: 
Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007) 
(observing how the EPA “focus[es] like a laser” on protecting the environment, whereas 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs takes “a broader view and consider[s] 
how, for example, an environmental proposal will affect energy resources, tax revenues, 
health policy, etc.”). 
84.See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006) (making the D.C. Circuit the exclusive court with 
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the EPA’s air toxic rules, along with many other 
types of challenges). 
85.See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 47 (discussing these virtues of the D.C. Circuit); Peter 
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1004, 1041, 1070 (offering this hypothesis and 
finding it to be true in their study of government-wide rulemakings during the 1980s). 
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accountability, particularly with regard to advancing the public 
interest in important and complex agency rules.  
 The air toxic rules also provide a good set of rules for study 
because the rules were promulgated by two different presidential 
administrations—those of President Bill Clinton and President 
George W. Bush.86 Although most of the litigation of the EPA’s 
hazardous air pollutant (HAPs) rules occurred during the Bush 
administration, the majority of the air toxic rules appealed to the 
courts were developed in principle by the EPA during the Clinton 
administration.87 The data thus provide an opportunity for 
comparing EPA interactions with the courts under different 
presidential administrations.  
 Although the air toxic emission standards potentially present a 
best case for studying productive relations between agencies and 
courts with regard to advancing the public interest, the HAPs 
rules are also relatively typical examples of pollution control 
standards and thus should extrapolate well to other rule-making 
settings. Like many of the EPA’s pollution control standards, the 
air toxic standards are mandated by statute and require the EPA 
to base pollution control requirements on what it determines to 
be the best available methods for limiting industrial emissions.88 
Specifically, section 112 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to 
                                                 
86.See infra Appendix 1. 
87.The crossover rules were developed as proposed rules and subjected to notice and 
comment under President Clinton but were finalized under President Bush. See infra 
Appendix 1. The features that triggered litigation were present in the original rule 
proposals and thus are attributable primarily to the Clinton EPA. See, e.g., Mossville 
Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the final 
rule questioned in the action was promulgated in 2002); Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. 
EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1089-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing the EPA’s 1996 rule, the 
petitioners’ requests for review and reconsideration, the EPA’s 2001 denial of 
reconsideration, and the petitioners’ subsequent request for review of this denial); 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Polyvinyl Chloride and 
Copolymers Production, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,886, 45,886 (July 10, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 63) (“The NESHAP for this source category were proposed on December 8, 2000.”); see 
also Sierra Club v. EPA, (Sierra Club I) 353 F.3d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In 1998, 
EPA announced proposed emission standards for primary copper smelter and initiated 
notice-and-comment procedures.”); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Primary Copper Smelting, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,478, 40,478 (July 12, 2002) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“Today’s action constitutes final administrative action on the 
proposed NESHAP for primary copper smelting.”). It remains possible, however, that 
based on comments, the Clinton EPA might have withdrawn some of the litigated features 
at the final rule stage. 
88.See Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d at 979-81. 
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identify currently available or soon-to-be-available pollution 
control technologies for each major class and category of industry 
and to select the technology in each industrial category that best 
fulfills congressional goals for vigorous but affordable pollution 
reductions.89 The EPA then converts the pollution reduction 
capabilities of the selected technology to numerical emission 
limits or actual specified technological fixes for each major 
industrial source of HAPs.90 For example, one HAPs rule sets 
standards for air toxic emissions from boat manufacturing;91 
another rule sets emission standards for cellulose product 
manufacturing;92 and another applies to coke ovens.93 Though the 
rules affect very different types of industries, they are comparable 
insofar as each typically follows the same analytical steps, that is, 
defining the affected industry, setting standards for emissions 
limitations, and establishing monitoring requirements.94 The 
EPA’s promulgation of the rules is also constrained by statutory 
deadlines, and these deadlines are often backed by lawsuits.95  
 This Study focuses specifically on the air toxic rules that were 
litigated to judgment and traces their life cycles from the initial 
development of the proposed standard, to the final rule, to the 
fate of the rule after judicial review.96 Such a life cycle view of the 
rules provides insights into agency-court interactions at each 
                                                 
89.See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2006) (requiring, for example, that emissions from existing 
plants meet at least “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 
percent of the existing sources”). 
90.See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 809-11 (1977) (specifying three steps in setting technology-
based standards: (1) categorizing industries; (2) identifying the contents of their respective 
wastewaters; and (3) identifying the range of control technologies available); see also 
Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 839, 853 (1977) (discussing questions regarding the effectiveness of pollution 
control technologies under various plant ages, sizes, and manufacturing conditions). 
91.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/mactfnlalph.html (last updated Nov. 
15, 2011) (providing the table of complete HAPs rules). 
92.Id. 
93.Id. 
94.See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 63.5683 (2010) (describing the applicability of NESHAP rules that 
govern boat manufacturing); id. § 63.5698 (providing emission limits for open molding 
resin and gel coat operations in boat manufacturing); id. § 63.5725 (describing monitoring 
requirements). 
95.See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2006) (setting deadlines for rule promulgation); Wagner et al., 
supra note 9, at 125 (describing how more than 70% of these deadlines have been 
reinforced by deadline suits that were subsequently settled with EPA). 
96.See infra Part III.B. 
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critical stage of the administrative process.97 This Study also 
places the litigated rules within the larger set of rules from which 
they are drawn, which further illuminates important features of 
agency-court-interest group interactions that have been largely 
unexplored in the literature. For example, setting the litigated 
rules against the larger set of rules from which they are drawn 
provides a denominator for calculating the rate of litigation of 
agency rulemakings.98 This Study also examines the litigated 
rules with respect to their judicially-identified defects and then 
compares them against the larger set to determine whether the 
air toxic standards that were reversed by the court are similar to 
the larger set that were not challenged.99  
 To gain insights inside the black box of agency rulemakings, 
this Study utilizes several different methods, 
including:quantitative methods, such as coding rules and dockets 
to construct a larger quantitative database; semi-quantitative 
methods, such as comparing court opinions; and qualitative 
methods, such conducting case studies and interviewing 
stakeholders. Such an eclectic empirical approach offers the most 
promising means of gathering information about a process that 




 This Section presents findings that correspond to the questions 
presented earlier. First and foremost, are the courts an important 
force in advancing the public interest? Second, when the courts 
intervene on behalf of the public interest, do the agencies respond 
and respect their orders? And, finally, are there other costs to 
                                                 
97.Professors Schuck and Elliott conducted a comprehensive study that, among other 
things, traced the fate of rules after remand across all agencies. See Schuck & Elliott, 
supra note , at 1043-54. Except for their study and the reinforcing data provided by HUME, 
supra note , at 70-91, and Jordan, supra note , at 416-39, there has been very little 
commentary or empirical analysis of this important aspect of agency decision making. See 
also supra note 25 and accompanying text. How an agency responds to a court opinion 
tells, in theory, how effective courts are in guiding the agencies. Understanding whether 
agencies ultimately repair defective rules, as well as how they do so in light of the opinion, 
may provide useful information regarding the impact of judicial review.  
98.See infra Part III.A.2. 
99.See infra Part III.C. 
100.See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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judicial review that could ultimately impede the agency’s ability 
to advance the public interest?  
 As discussed in more detail below, the data reveal that the 
courts encounter several significant obstacles in protecting the 
public interest against industry capture. The first impediment is 
the simple fact that the courts were summoned to oversee only a 
small minority of the EPA’s HAPs rules, despite evidence that a 
larger number of these rules might be candidates for successful 
challenge by public interest groups.101 This limited role of the 
courts results in large part from the scarce resources available to 
public interest groups to participate, at least in comparison to 
their industry counterparts.102 Even when the courts were 
involved in judicial oversight of the HAPs rules, however, the 
courts’ remedial powers were surprisingly limited. In several 
cases, reversals and remands were effectively ignored by the EPA 
without consequence. Indeed, the repromulgation of vacated 
regulations by EPA has been the exception rather than the 
rule.103 
 At the same time that the findings highlight the limitations of 
the courts’ powers, the findings also underscore the value of this 
same judicial oversight role to catch significant agency violations. 
Most of the issues in the challenged HAPs rules were not factual 
disagreements, but rather allegations that the EPA violated the 
terms of its authorizing statute. The majority of these statutory 
challenges were successful.104 Significant defects thus appear to 
afflict EPA’s HAPs rules, at least for the rules challenged in 
court. 
 Offsetting these limited, but important benefits of judicial 
review are possible countervailing costs to the rulemaking 
process.  First and foremost is the ability of stakeholders to 
leverage the threat of judicial review against the agency in 
exchange for changes earlier in the process. When confronted 
with the prospect of litigation, agency staff eager to see a rule to 
completion may make a number of concessions in the proposed 
and final rule in order to appease vigorous participants. The 
resultant, cumulative changes may lead to a final rule that has 
                                                 
101.See infra Section III.A.2. 
102.See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
103.See infra Section III.B. 
104.See infra Section III.B.2. 
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been significantly altered in ways that disproportionately 
advantage industry, at least in settings like the HAPs 
rulemakings where the number of participants is skewed heavily 
in favor of industry relative to public interest groups.105 
 In the case of EPA’s HAPs rules, then, the net ability of the 
courts to advance the public interest is unclear. For every appeal 
of a HAPs rule filed by a public interest group, there are ten other 
HAPs rules that were not litigated, half of which were not even 
the subject of comments by public interest groups.  These other 
rules could be similarly defective.106 Even more perversely, 
features that public interest groups found objectionable in final 
HAPs rules could have originated from the EPA’s effort to 
compromise with industry in earlier stages of the rulemaking 
specifically in order to stave off these industry stakeholders’ 
potentially more numerous challenges. 
 
A. The Role of the Courts in Advancing the Public Interest 
 
 Two primary sources of data shed light on the extent to which 
the courts advance the public interest in the EPA’s air toxic rules: 
the court opinions themselves and the larger set of rules from 
which the litigated rules are drawn. Each is considered in turn. 
 
 
 1. The Court Opinions 
 
 Although only seven of the EPA’s HAPs rules were litigated to 
judgment, these cases, when read end-to-end, offer powerful 
evidence of how public interest groups are able to leverage the 
courts to correct agency lapses in air toxic emissions standards. 
Of the seven cases, all but one was brought initially by an 
environmental group.107 Even more notably, the 
environmentalists won all but one of their challenges in the court 
of appeals.108 Despite its high loss rate in the courts, the EPA did 
                                                 
105.See infra notes 232-246 and accompanying text. 
106.See infra Section III.A.2. 
107.See infra Appendix 1. 
108.See infra Appendix 1. 
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not file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court in any of the 
cases.109  
 The fact that environmental groups used the courts more 
frequently than industry and generally succeeded in their appeals 
underscores how judicial review can serve as an important 
institutional mechanism for advancing the public interest. 
Relative to the few other measures of public interest litigation in 
the literature, in fact, the air toxic rules may well represent a 
high water mark in the public interest use110 and success111 of 
rule challenges in the courts.112  See Figure 1. 
                                                 
109.See infra Appendix 1. Professor Hume also finds a very low rate of petition filing 
across all agencies in his empirical study of agencies’ responses to opinion writing. HUME, 
supra note , at 49-50. Thus, the EPA’s willingness to allow the opinions to stand without 
further review is not surprising when set across these larger agency statistics.  
110.Public interest group dominance of the appellate challenges to EPA rules may be 
unusual, or at least may be a more recent phenomenon. Industry seemed to dominate the 
challenges to the EPA’s earliest technology-based standards promulgated under the Clean 
Water Act. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Review of 
Technological Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 75 AICHE SYMPOSIUM SERIES: 
WATER—1978, at 1, 9-10, 15-16 (1979) (detailing the industry’s “blunderbuss” attacks on 
EPA’s first technology-based standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act); Lettie 
McSpadden Wenner, The Reagan Era in Environmental Regulation, in CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 41, 48 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990) (reporting based on an 
empirical study of appellate litigation from 1970 to 1985 that “[i]ndustry exceeded 
environmental groups’ complaints against government actions at the appellate level as 
early as 1976, and this was reversed only once, in 1983, when industry’s inputs fell off”). A 
number of commenters also predict and even assume that industry challenges to 
environmental rules will outnumber public interest challenges, if for no other reason than 
that delayed rule promulgation brings added benefits to industries who oppose pollution 
control standards. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION 
GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4-5 (1978) (“The delay which can 
be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to undertake other measures to reduce or 
eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 729, 737-38 (same). 
111.The literature identifies the EPA’s success rate, rather than that of individual sets of 
petitioners. These studies of judicial review of EPA rulemaking report a slightly better 
EPA success rate in the D.C. Circuit than found in this Study—33% to 41% as compared to 
14% in the HAPs rules. Professor Adler found that the EPA won only 33% of its 69 cases in 
the D.C. Circuit from 1993 to 2000, cases which primarily involved the challenge of a 
rulemaking; the remaining cases were either lost or mixed in their results. See Jonathan 
H. Adler, No Intelligible Principles: The EPA’s Record in Federal Court, REASON 
FOUNDATION, 10-11 (May 1, 2000), 
http://reason.org/files/3217ecd7bf37b4ea6aa81d4dc9f59a26.pdf. Professors Schroeder and 
Glicksman found that the EPA’s rules were sustained in only 53% of the 111 cases from 
1991 to 1999. See Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, 
and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371, 10,374 
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Figure 1: Fate of Litigated Cases in the EPA’s Air Toxic 
Emission Rulemakings 
 It is not just the public interest groups’ dominance in utilizing 
the courts to check agency discretion in these HAPs rules that 
stands out, but it is also the strength of their victories—both in 
numbers and in the language of the courts’ opinions. In their 
                                                                                                                 
(2001) (reporting a 53% success rate for the EPA, which they note is consistent with other 
studies of all agency rule-making appeals during a similar, albeit shorter, time period).  
 The limited empirical studies available also suggest that the EPA fares worse in the 
HAPs rules as compared with other agencies. In his study, Hume reports an affirmance 
rate by the court of appeals of 48.5%, in the year 2000, for all agencies aggregated 
together, but only a small portion, 7% of the remaining cases, involved reversals. See 
HUME, supra note , at 19. Most of the rest were dismissals (27.3%) or “other” (17.2%). See 
id. Hume states that “[o]ver the past half century, the likelihood of an affirmance has been 
at least forty percentage points higher than the chance of reversal.” Id. By contrast, 
agency-wide, Schuck and Elliott found a 76.6% success rate for all agencies in rule-making 
challenges in 1984 to 1985, a rate that increased from lower success rates in pre-Chevron 
periods, like 61% in 1975 and 55% in 1965. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note , at 1007-08. 
Within their aggregated study, however, when they examined public health agencies that 
conducted only rulemakings, the affirmances dropped to about 40%, which is in line with 
the results found in this study and the later studies discussed above. Id. at 1021. 
112.See also infra Appendix 1 (providing supporting data). 
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challenges to five of the rules—a sixth was remanded on other 
grounds—the environmental groups raised twenty-three different 
legal claims, and won on ten issues, or about 40%, of these 
challenges.113 Moreover, the bulk of the victories—eight issues—
were challenges to the agency’s interpretation of the statute—
Chevron Step One—rather than details concerning EPA’s fact-
finding or explanation.114 This feature of their victories is 
important, as discussed later, because it imposes increased legal 
constraints on the agency’s entire rule-making project.115 
Industry, by contrast, raised only four issues in their three 
appeals, and two of the three appeals were interventions in suits 
initiated by the public interest groups.116 Industry prevailed on 
two of these four issues, and both issues were fact specific—
Chevron Step Two.117 
 Another telling aspect of the courts’ role in advancing the 
public interest with respect to the air toxic rules is the tenor of 
the courts’ opinions, particularly in the last two major cases 
decided in 2007. Both of the 2007 panels—each of which had two 
Republican appointees and one Democrat appointee118—appeared 
not only exasperated, but alarmed at how the EPA’s deviations 
from the statute and prior precedent systematically 
underprotected the public health. For example, in Sierra Club II, 
the court reprimanded the EPA for focusing too narrowly on the 
capabilities of existing pollution control devices rather than on 
larger process and input controls used by industry to reduce air 
toxic emissions: “EPA’s rationales ... amount to nothing more 
                                                 
113.See infra Appendix 3; see also infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. The court 
vacated one rule because it was legally connected to a defective hazardous waste rule, and 
thus this public interest group appeal drops out of much of the analysis presented in the 
remainder of Part III of this article. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 
1254 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
114.See infra Appendix 3; see also infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
115.See infra Part III.B.2. 
116.See infra Appendix 3. 
117.See infra Appendix 3. 
118.In Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the panel 
was composed of Circuit Judges Thomas Beall Griffith and Judith Ann Wilson Rogers—
both Republican appointees—and Chief Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg—a Democrat 
appointee. In Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2007) Sierra Club II), the 
panel was composed of Chief Justice Douglas H. Ginsburg and Senior Circuit Judge 
Stephen Fain Williams, both Republican appointees, and Circuit Judge David S. Tatel, a 
Democrat appointee. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
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than a concern about ensuring that its floor is achievable by all 
kilns in the subcategory—precisely the position we rejected in 
Cement Kiln.”119 This judicial frustration with the EPA’s legally 
indefensible, industry-leaning interpretation of its mandate runs 
through both 2007 opinions, which hold in favor of the public 
interest groups on all seven points the groups raised in 
challenging two sets of air toxic emission rules.120 
 The possibility that the courts provide an important 
institutional check on defective, industry-captured rules is 
strongly supported by these cases.121 To gain still better purchase 
on the capabilities of the courts to advance the public interest, 
however, this Study also positions the litigated rules against the 
larger set from which they are drawn.  
 
 2. The Denominator Factor: Comparing the Appeals Against the 
Larger Set of Air Toxic Emission Standards 
 
 The first finding reveals that public interest groups are clear 
beneficiaries of judicial review,122 but the corollary proposition—
namely that the courts serve as a significant check on agency 
policies that unreasonably undermine the public interest—does 
not follow automatically. The power of the courts is in part a 
function of the extent to which they are summoned to review 
rules. If courts are rarely deployed to run interference on the 
EPA’s rulemakings, then their influence as overseers is likely to 
be much less significant than if they are a frequent arbiter of 
disputes. 
 Because fewer than 8% of the air toxic rules were ultimately 
litigated to judgment,123 this denominator is likely to be 
important to assessing the significance of the courts as guardians 
of the public interest. More than 90% of the eighty-three air toxic 
rules were simply never reviewed by the courts. As an empirical 
matter, the low rate of appeals is consistent with the low appeal 
                                                 
119.479 F.3d at 881. 
120.See infra notes 182-87; see also infra Appendix 3 (listing in more detail the issues that 
were reversed and remanded to EPA in these two cases). 
121.See infra Appendix 3. 
122.See supra Part III.A.1. 
123.See supra text accompanying note 107 (noting that only seven HAPs were litigated). 
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rate found in the empirical literature124 and further refutes the 
widespread, but unsupported, assertions of very high rates—
around 80%—of judicial challenges to “significant” EPA rules that 
populated the literature in the 1990s.125  
 Yet if the public interest victories constitute only a small slice 
of the larger rule-making pie, it becomes important to determine 
whether this low appeal rate occurs because the remaining, 
approximately 90% of the rules are viewed as adequate from the 
standpoint of public health protection or, alternatively, whether 
appealed rules are low in number because of the scarce resources 
of public interest groups. If the public interest groups appeal only 
the rules they find problematic, then the system appears to be 
working quite well in protecting public health. A low appeal rate 
suggests that the EPA is generally doing a good job and that 
when the EPA slips up, the public interest groups are on hand to 
appeal. Equally impressive from the standpoint of this 
hypothesis, when the public interest groups do appeal, they tend 
to prevail, reinforcing their shrewd judgment on rule deficiencies. 
On the other hand, if the public interest groups find themselves 
strapped for resources and able to appeal only a small fraction of 
the rules that they would challenge in an ideal world of infinite 
resources, then the low appeal rate may instead be a worrisome 
                                                 
124.See Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note , at 10,375 n.40 (finding 111 appeals of rules 
that resulted in appellate opinions, or 3%, out of a total of 3553 rules promulgated by the 
EPA during the 1990s). Professor Coglianese found a higher rate of litigation for 
economically significant rules promulgated by the EPA under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act from 1980-1991; roughly a third of these rules were litigated. Cary 
Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative 
Process 95 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with 
author).  
125.See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 334 (1991) (“Both environmental 
organizations and industry took advantage of the increased judicial access and together 
challenged between 80 and 85 percent of EPA’s major decisions.”); see also KAY LEHMAN 
SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 367 
(1986) (“[V]irtually every regulation issued by such agencies as the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is challenged 
in court either by environmental and consumer groups or by industry.”). Professor 
Coglianese traced the origins of the Ruckelshaus statement that “[e]ighty percent of what 
the [EPA] does is finally decided ... in a negotiated or formal court decision,” supra note 
124, at 90, and found that it had no empirical support or data behind it, id. at 85-93 
(quoting William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the 
Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL. L. 455, 463 
(1985)). 
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sign that the judicial oversight mechanism for ensuring agency 
accountability is sorely incomplete.  
 The available evidence supports the more pessimistic view that 
the low appeal rate reflects limited public interest resources 
rather than a low number of rules that actually warrant 
challenge. In an interview with a public interest group attorney 
involved in the air toxics litigation, the attorney cited the group’s 
scarce resources as a decisive factor in the group’s decision to 
select only a handful of rules to appeal in court and emphasized 
that the small number of appealed rules most certainly should 
not be read to suggest the group’s satisfaction with the remaining 
eighty-four emission standards.126 In selecting the rules to 
litigate, moreover, the public interest attorney conceded to using 
back-of-the-envelope assessments of the precedential value of the 
appeal, the extent of health protection potentially gained, and the 
ease of filing and prevailing in an appeal.127 These litigation-
based assessments, the attorney admitted, undoubtedly miss 
important rules worthy of challenge, but the group found it had to 
triage its scarce resources.128 
 Public interest group challenges are further limited by the 
groups’ inability to comment on all of the EPA’s HAPs rules. 
Specifically, public interest groups filed comments on less than 
half of the EPA’s air toxic rules, even though all of the rules have 
relatively direct implications for public health protection.129 Their 
selection strategy for commenting follows the same back-of-the-
envelope assessment used for litigation.130 Yet if the public 
interest groups do not submit comments on the majority of the 
rules, then they waive their right to appeal those rules unless the 
agency is put on notice of the challenges in comments proffered 
by another party, such as a state.131 Indeed, in two of the seven 
                                                 
126.See Interview with anonymous public interest litigator involved in HAPs rulemakings 
during the 1990s, in Chicago, Ill. (May 29, 2009). 
127.Id. 
128.Id. 
129.See infra Appendix 2; infra Figure 5 and accompanying text. The public interest 
litigator interviewed for this Study, see supra note 126, indicated that the reason public 
interest groups did not submit comments on all HAPs rules was due to scarce resources 
and not because they viewed the rules as unimportant to public health protection or likely 
to be satisfactory in substance to their public interest constituencies.  
130.See supra note 126-27 and accompanying text. 
131.See, e.g., Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from 
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-25 (1985) (outlining the rationale 
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litigated rules, the environmental petitioners did fail to file 
comments on the challenged rule but relied on comments filed by 
states to establish that the agency had adequate notice of their 
concerns.132 While this strategy worked most of the time,133 for 
two issues raised in these two cases, the courts held that the state 
comments did not raise their concerns with “reasonable 
specificity” to put the agency on notice about the problem and 
that the public interest groups had waived the challenges.134 
Thus, even in the cases litigated to judgment, environmentalists 
waived some potentially meritorious challenges because they 
failed to file comments, which in turn appears to be a result of 
scarce resources.  
 It also bears note that the litigated rules, as a group, are 
generally similar to the nonlitigated rules with respect to factors, 
such as the extent of industry dominance during the rule-making 
life cycle and changes made to the final rule based on notice and 
comment, that might be expected to predict public interest 
challenges.135 For example, 85% of the changes made by the EPA 
to the proposed rules weakened the rules. This is true in both the 
litigated rules and the much larger set of rules that were not 
litigated by public interest groups.136 The only aberration is the 
PET resin rule, for which industry was the sole petitioner filing 
an appeal.137 Ironically, however, this rule involved considerably 
more industry participation during the preproposal stage138 and 
                                                                                                                 
behind the exhaustion requirement and arguing for the abolition of exceptions to the 
exhaustion requirement). This requirement is also imposed by some statutes, including 
the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2006).  
132.See, e.g., Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (relying on state comments 
for issues raised on appeal, all of which were rejected). 
133.Out of eleven issues raised by environmental petitioners in Sierra Club I, only one 
was rejected based on the environmental group’s failure to raise it during the comment 
process. 353 F.3d at 991. 
134.In Mossville Enviromental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), two issues were raised and deemed waived because of the nonspecificity of the state 
comments. 
135.See infra Appendix 2. The litigated rules were promulgated across different 
administrations in basically the same proportion as the larger set of ninety rules. See infra 
Appendix 1.  
136.For every measure of interest group engagement and rule change, the mean for the 
litigated rules is within one standard deviation of the mean for all ninety air toxic rules. 
See infra Appendix 2. 
137.See infra Appendix 1. 
138.The PET resin rule involved 302 informal contacts versus a mean of 85 (SD=104) for 
all 90 rules. See infra Appendix 2. 
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more changes made to weaken the rule139 than was the case for 
the larger set of ninety air toxics rules. Despite industry’s 
effective monopolization of this particular rule-making process, 
relative to the larger set of rules, several industry members were 
sufficiently troubled by one feature of the rule to file 
administrative petitions for reconsideration with the EPA and 
ultimately pursue an appeal to judgment in the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia.140  
 There is one bright spot in this otherwise dour assessment of 
the extent to which courts are engaged in overseeing the bulk of 
the EPA’s rules: the courts were much more involved in deadline 
suits, which were filed for more than 70% of all of the air toxic 
rules and resulted in consent decrees in all cases.141 The deadline 
suits ensured that the standards would at least be promulgated 
in a reasonable time frame, although the substance of the rules 
was not under consideration. The much higher public interest 
litigation rate in filing deadline suits—73% of rules—as compared 
to appealing rules on the merits—7% of rules—is likely explained 
by the relative ease with which the litigation can be brought: no 
substantive issues or technical considerations need to be analyzed 
in order to assess whether the EPA has a statutory deadline and 
is missing it.142 
 
 3. Summary 
 
 The findings spotlight the importance of the courts in 
advancing the public interest, but they also raise questions about 
the comprehensiveness of this litigation in relation to the much 
larger set of rules of which they are a part. When summoned, the 
courts exert a powerful role as guardians of the public interest. 
However, the courts are involved in overseeing the substance of 
                                                 
139.The PET resin rule involved 20 changes weakening the rule versus a mean of 10.5 
(SD=8.5) for all 90 rules. See infra Appendix 2. 
140.See Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
141.See Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 52. 
142.See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2006). Deadline suits can be filed with almost no 
investment of time or effort and almost always lead to success. The only facts in 
contention are whether there was a statutory deadline for a rule and whether the agency 
missed that deadline. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
999-1000 (5th ed. 2006) (describing these features of deadline suits). 
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less than 10% of the EPA’s air toxic standards.143 More 
importantly, at least from the standpoint of the public interest, 
the evidence suggests that the litigated rules may only be the tip 
of the public interest litigation iceberg within the EPA’s larger air 
toxics standard-setting project. 
 
B. What Is the Impact of the Courts’ Rulings on the EPA’s       
Rule-Making Project? 
 
 Even though affected stakeholders may not be able to file 
appeals on all air toxic rules that they find legally deficient, the 
courts exert a radius of influence that goes well beyond the 
handful of litigated cases that end in a judgment. Court opinions 
on agency rules provide important directions for how the agency 
must interpret the authorizing statute, find facts, and provide 
accessible public explanations for its decisions.144 Indeed, the very 
genius of judicial review is that judicial precedent will permeate 
the entirety of the agency’s rule-making project and impact all 
future decisions, thus exerting an influence that goes well beyond 
the individual cases.  
 After first exploring the more direct impacts of the courts’ 
remands on the EPA’s standard-setting activities, this Part then 
considers the extent to which a few, strong court victories might 
influence the larger set of the EPA’s air toxic rules. 
 
 1. Repairing Deficient Rules 
 
 The most direct and immediate benefit to winning a case in 
court is that it will lead to changes in the rule. If 
environmentalists convince a court that the EPA should 
promulgate emission limits for mercury in its cement kiln rule, 
then on remand the EPA will make this change and the air will 
                                                 
143.See supra text accompanying note 118. 
144.See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of 
Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646, 666-68 (1988) (touting the value of 
courts in keeping agencies operating within statutory limits); Thomas O. Sargentich, The 
Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. 
REV. 385, 397-402 (same); cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction.”). 
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be cleaner.145 If industry convinces the court that the EPA’s 
monitoring requirements are excessively costly, then on remand 
the EPA will develop monitoring requirements that are less 
expensive.146 Although this impact of judicial review is limited to 
the rule under challenge, the repair of deficient rules is still a 
valuable and seemingly automatic effect of judicial review.  
 This inevitable impact of the courts’ orders on agency 
rulemaking is nevertheless absent from most of the litigated 
HAPs rules. Of all of the appealed rules that ended in a remand—
five out of six rules—only one of the deficient rules has been 
repaired, and even for this single rule, it took the EPA a decade to 
make the repairs.147  See Table 1. 
 




































































                                                 
145.See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA (National Lime II), 233 F.3d 625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
146.See, e.g., Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
147. In the sixth rule, the court vacated several passages it deemed were in violation of 
the statute and the remainder of the rule was left intact. Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1371-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 







 The failure of the EPA to repair remanded and vacated rules is 
in theory a temporary phenomenon, but the pervasiveness of the 
EPA’s noncompliance is significant enough to suggest real limits 
to the courts’ oversight role of EPA’s air toxics rules. Specifically, 
four rules remanded by the courts in 2003, 2004, and 2007 are not 
only still unrevised, but the EPA has not even issued a proposed 
rule for three of them.153 
 Despite the public interest wins on paper, then, the public 
interest victories remain largely symbolic in practice. Indeed, for 
the few vacated standards, the public interest successes in court 
may have unwittingly set air quality protections backward rather 
than forward.154 For the remanded and unrevised rules, there are 
currently no federal standards in place limiting toxic emissions 
from the covered industries.  States may apply their own state-
based restrictions while these federal standards are being 
hammered out,155 but this is presumably not the result that 
public interest groups had hoped for in challenging these rules. 
Ironically and in contrast, in its one solitary appeal in Arteva 
                                                 
148.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Portland 
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement 
Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970 (Sept. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
149.See, e.g., E-mail from Susan Stahle, Office of General Counsel, EPA, to author (June 
30, 2010, 12:09 EST) (on file with author). 
150.See, e.g., E-mail from Jodi Howard, Envtl. Eng’r, EPA, to author (June 22, 2010, 12:58 
EST) (on file with author); see also  NESHAP: Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers 
Production, Amendments, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFF., 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimple Search (search for RIN 2060-AN33) (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
151.In Spring 2010, EPA had no projected date for the revision of this rule. See NESHAP: 
Brick and Structural Clay and Clay Ceramics, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www. 
reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch (search for RIN 2060-AP69) (last visited Nov. 
28, 2011). 
152.National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: 
Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 
32,005 (proposed June 4, 2010) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
153.See supra Table 1. 
154.The court vacated the EPA’s air toxic standards in Mossville, 370 F.3d 1232, 1234 
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2007); and Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 489 F.3d 1364, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 2007), leaving no federal standard in place 
while the agency repaired the defective standard.  
155.42 U.S.C. § 7412(j) (2006) (requiring sources to obtain a permit that incorporates 
individualized emission limits in situations where no limits have been promulgated). 
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Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, industry actually enjoyed a double 
victory as a result of the EPA’s dilatory reparation efforts.156 Not 
only did the court remand the rule to the EPA, but it stayed the 
standard as applied to the petitioners’ facilities.157 Arteva’s 
industry-appellants have thus operated free of federal air toxic 
standards, with no sign of a proposed revised rule on the horizon. 
 The EPA’s protracted delays in repairing rules on remand may 
not be unusual. In their study of the effect of remand on agency 
rules, Professors Schuck and Elliott identified potentially 
significant delays in repairing rules across all of the agencies; five 
years after the courts’ opinions, about 10% of the remanded rules 
had not been addressed by the agencies.158 In his analysis of 
agency responses to remands government-wide, Professor Hume 
also found a tendency by agencies to delay implementation of 
court-imposed repairs, particularly those that the agencies found 
disagreeable.159 Finally, in her recent study of serial litigation in 
the courts’ review of rulemakings, Professor Meazell notes how 
many remands “fizzle into nothingness” with regard to the 
agency’s ultimate response.160 
 The reasons for the EPA’s dismal track record in repairing 
rules are likely complex and variable, even within the small 
group of remanded rules that are the subject of this study. A 
number of administrative law scholars have suggested that 
judicial review is too abstracted and legalized and may demand 
the impossible from agencies on remand.161 The cement kiln rule 
provides a possible illustration of this phenomenon. In the cement 
kiln rule, EPA worked tirelessly to repair the rule on remand, but 
                                                 
156.323 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
157.Id. at 1092. 
158.See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note , at 1050. 
159.See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 77 (“[A]dministrators ... confess to limiting the effects 
of adverse decisions.... [by] decid[ing] to delay implementation for as long as possible.”). 
160.Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1722, 1781 (2011). 
161.See, e.g., Cross, supra note , at 1321-22 (expressing this general concern); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Bureaucracy, Democracy and Judicial Review: The Uneasy Coexistence of Legal, 
Managerial and Political Accountability 8 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 194, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1431601 (“When courts find that 
officials have misunderstood or misapplied their mandates they substitute judicial 
judgment for the judgment of administrators who have more direct connection to the 
democratic political process than judges have. Judicial review can undermine the 
bureaucracy’s political accountability rather than reinforcing it.”). 
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it faced opposition from virtually every affected party at each 
stage of the revision process.  See Figure 2. EPA’s revised 
proposal, which was published five years after the court’s 
remand, attracted over 1700 comments.162 After withdrawing its 
revised final rule because of litigation threats—three petitions 
were filed against the revised rule163—the EPA published a 
second revised proposal in May 2009, which was more than 50 
pages long and triggered another 3000 comments.164 The EPA 
promulgated a second revised final rule in September 2010165 and 
has already received a petition for reconsideration and published 
a proposal for amendments.166 Finalization of this ten-year 
revision effort does not appear imminent.   
 
Figure 2: EPA’s Federal Register Activity Dedicated to 
Repairing the Remanded Cement Kiln Rule 
 
                                                 
162.National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Portland 
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement 
Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970, 54,972 (Sept. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
163.National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement 
Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,139 (May 6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
164.National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Port and Cement 
Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 54,972. 
165.Id. at 54,970. 
166.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland 
Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement 
Plants, 76 Fed. Reg. 2860 (Jan. 18, 2011). EPA has also received a petition for 
reconsideration from NRDC regarding the allowance of an affirmative defense for 
malfunctions. See NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2007-0051, PETITION FOR 
REVIEW, available at http://regulations.gov. 
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Other remanded HAPs rules have received less attention from 
EPA, and the agency’s delays in repairing these rules seem to be 
the result of simple inaction.167 There are a number of possible 
explanations for this inaction. For all of the remanded rules, 
George W. Bush was the chief executive at the time,168 and 
diverting agency resources to repair rules may not have been a 
priority of his administration, particularly when the resulting 
                                                 
167.Mossville, Environmental Action Now v. EPA, decided in 2004, involved vacatur of a 
rule on appeal by environmental petitioners, and the EPA is only now engaging in the 
proposed-rule process that is governed by a subsequent consent decree with petitioners. 
See 370 F.3d 1232, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2004); supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
According to the rule docket, virtually no activity occurred with respect to repairing this 
rule over a nearly nine-year span, from 2002 to 2011. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET 
NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0037, NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR 
POLLUTANTS FOR POLYVINYL CHLORIDE AND COPOLYMERS PRODUCTION, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov. The EPA’s semiannual agenda similarly reveals that the 
agency continues to roll back the projected timeline for the proposed rule. See supra Table 
1. The EPA also appears to have made only limited progress in responding to the stay of 
the PET resin rule with respect to petitioners as a result of Arteva Specialities S.A.R.L. v. 
EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The EPA’s docket lists only two documents 
logged in after 2001: the final rule was promulgated in 2001 and stayed in 2003. See 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0005, NESHAP POLYMERS AND 
RESINS, available at http://www.regulations.gov. Both documents in the PET docket are 
efforts by the EPA to develop more information on the cost-effectiveness of the monitoring 
requirements for subsets of industries, which was the issue remanded by the court.   
168.See infra Appendix 1. 
40                   WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW          [Vol. 53:000 
 
delays uniformly benefit industry.169 The EPA may also lack the 
resources to devote to the reparation of rules when it already 
faces a backlog of air toxic standards that are behind schedule.170 
Indeed, because none of the remands and vacaturs, save possibly 
one, involves a legal obligation to promulgate the revised 
standard by a certain date, the EPA may have been first devoting 
air toxic staff to standards with legally enforceable deadlines.171 
Public interest groups may even support this prioritization 
because it maximizes the number of standards in effect.  
 In any event and whatever the explanation for the EPA’s 
delays in repairing the remanded rules, from the standpoint of 
the courts’ role in advancing the public interest, the findings are 
disappointing. Strong opinions and remands do not lead to 
repaired rules within a reasonable timeframe, and the public 




2. Precedential Effects 
 
                                                 
169.See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra note , at 1052 (suggesting that certain events may 
occur after remand that explain agency inaction or resistance, including “changes in 
presidential or agency leadership”). 
170.See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing statutory deadlines reinforced 
by judicial decrees for the majority of air toxic rules). 
171.The possibility that the EPA has limited resources and staff to devote to air toxic rules 
and prioritizes the new rules that are enforced by statutory and judicial deadlines, rather 
than the remanded rules, is further supported by the aberrational nature of the EPA’s 
inaction in repairing air toxic rules as compared with other EPA rulemakings. In a 1989 
article, Rosemary O’Leary discovered that EPA places a high priority on repairing 
remanded rules. Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies 
and Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 
561-62 (1989). Yet O’Leary did not discriminate between remands that were accompanied 
by deadlines or consent decrees and those that were not. In the latter case, the agency 
may actually put rule reparations as a lower priority when there are more pressing legal 
obligations to promulgate new rules on a tight schedule. 
172.Although public interest groups have requested the courts not to vacate rules that are 
remanded, see, e.g., National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recounting public 
interest request to that effect), the D.C. Circuit seems to take an ad hoc approach to 
remedy choices in its remand of rulemakings. In a concurrence in a related case, in fact, 
Judge Randolph bemoaned the court’s inattention to remedies and the problematic 
features of vacaturs for complex rulemakings when far superior remedial approaches, such 
as time-limited stays, allow the courts to ensure that the remedial work on the rule is not 
only completed, but is completed properly. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 
1250, 1262-64 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Randolph, J., concurring).  
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 Fortunately, the EPA’s inability to repair the remanded rules 
does not affect the larger precedential impact of the court 
opinions. The “rule of law” limits that the courts place on agency 
discretion provide arguably the single most significant impact 
that courts have on agency rulemakings.173 Judicial review also 
reminds the agency that there is an institution that can intervene 
to review its decisions. Precedent thus guides future rule-making 
decisions in ways that transcend the results in individual rule-
making projects. 
 From a systemic level, then, judicial review offers agencies 
directives on many rules. It constrains how the statute can be 
applied and interpreted across the entire rule-making project. 
This substantive influence is particularly evident in the courts’ 
opinions governing the air toxic rules.174 A coding of each of the 
litigated issues in all of the cases reveals that two-thirds of the 
issues remanded by the courts involved issues of statutory 
interpretation at the Chevron Step One stage.175 In fact, these 
statutory differences between the EPA and the courts on 
substantive matters of statutory interpretation became more, not 
less, frequent over time. By contrast, fact- or record-based 
challenges occurred in only four of the remands, and two of the 
issues were raised by public interest groups.  See Figure 3. One 
other empirical study also found a greater occurrence of Step 
One-based remands relative to Step Two-based remands, at least 
for the EPA’s rule challenges in the court of appeals.176  
                                                 
173.See generally supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
174.Because this Article’s hypothesis is concerned with ways that courts impact agencies, 
the cases where the courts reinforced the appropriateness of the EPA’s decisions are not 
considered in detail. This data is nevertheless collected in the larger table from which 
Figure 2 is drawn. See infra Appendix 3. 
175.See infra Figure 3. An issue was identified as Chevron Step One if the court found 
that the agency’s rule violated the clear terms of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (stating that Congress “has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue” and the agency got the answer wrong). Coding of 
the individual issues in each case is provided in Appendix 3; the page number assigned to 
each issue is provided for easy verification. All coding was conducted by the author. 
176.Once the agency gets past Step One, which it did in only 41% of the cases, see infra 
Figure 3, it faces very high odds—in the Shroeder & Glicksman study, a 92% chance—of 
being upheld during Step Two when the court considers only whether the agency’s 
interpretation was “permissible” or “reasonable” in light of the statute. Schroeder & 
Glicksman, supra note , at 10,376-77. Cf., HUME, supra note , at 21-22 (reporting that 
most of the agency losses in the courts of appeals are for failing to provide adequate 
justification and that only a few cases involve substantive grounds for reversal, such as a 
flawed interpretation of the statute).  




Figure 3: Number of Issues Won or Lost on Chevron Step 
One or 
Step 
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 Consistent with the Step One basis for most of the court 
remands, the emergent case law sets some “rule of law” limits 
on how the EPA can interpret and apply a statute in the course 
of its rulemakings.  See Text Box 1. Although there was slight 
ambiguity on a few issues,177 the courts’ rulings, particularly on 
several repeat issues, provide little room for the EPA to argue 
that the holdings are unclear.178 
                                                 
177.See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing wiggle room). 
178.See Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 876, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council 
v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1369, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also HUME, supra note , at 39-40 
(discussing the use of strongly worded judicial reprimands to catch the agency’s attention 
and limit its discretion in interpreting an opinion). 
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 Text Box 1: “Rule of Law” Constraints Imposed on the EPA’s 








1.  “No control” standard for individual hazardous substances is not 
an option under the statute; the EPA must set emission limits for all 
HAPs.  Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; National Lime II, 233 F.3d 
at 634; see also Final Rule for Portland Cement Kilns, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 54,970, 54,973 (Sept. 9, 2010) (confirming these constraints). 
 
2. EPA must measure “actual emissions” from best performers to set 
emission standards.  Achievability—that is, whether all firms can 
meet those limits—is not a consideration under the terms of the 
statute. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 880; see also 75 Fed. Reg. at 
54,973. 
 
3. Variability cannot be benchmarked against the low performers to 
determine industry capabilities. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 882; see 
also 75 Fed. Reg. at 54,973. 
 
4. Compliance extensions cannot be granted by the EPA outside of 
statutory deadlines. Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1373. 
 
5. EPA cannot create a low-risk exemption for major sources under 
Section 112. Id. at 1371. 
 
6. Non-technological mechanisms for control need to be included in 
the EPA’s analysis of firms’ capabilities for emissions reductions. 
The EPA cannot consider only technological mechanisms of control 
and ignore other methods of limiting HAPs emissions, such as 
changing inputs. Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; see also 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 54,973. 
 
7. EPA cannot substitute work practice standards for emission 
standards without satisfying the statutory criteria. Sierra Club II, 
479 F.3d at 884. 
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 However, even this strong body of precedent appears, in 
practice, to exert less influence on the EPA’s rules than one might 
expect. First and most striking is the fact that the EPA largely 
ignored or, when that failed, aggressively distinguished precedent 
that imposed more stringent standards on industry. The EPA’s 
effort to either ignore or distinguish away these judicial 
interpretations is evidenced in four of the five issues that the 
EPA lost179 when it litigated its brick kiln rule in 2007.180 This is 
also seen in at least one, if not all three, of the issues that the 
EPA lost when it defended the plywood rule in 2007.181 The 2007 
panel presiding over the challenge to the brick kiln rule seemed 
nonplussed by the EPA’s nonacquiescence: “Other than again 
claiming that it has no obligation to set floors unless sources take 
some deliberate action to control emissions, EPA has failed to 
offer any reason for distinguishing what it did here from what we 
invalidated in National Lime II.”182 Yet, even after the courts’ 
repeat admonishments, the EPA still may be considering ways to 
sidestep precedent through creative interpretations, such as 
                                                 
179.See, e.g., Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 880-81 (holding that the statute and D.C. Circuit 
cases are clear that in setting floors, the EPA must base standards on what the best 
performers actually achieve, rather than claiming that they must be set at a level that is 
achievable by all sources; the EPA tried to circumvent by redefining “best performing”); id. 
at 881-82 (holding that D.C. Circuit precedent made it clear that it was a violation of the 
statute for the EPA to use worst-performing sources as measure of variability in best-
performing sources without at least a demonstrated relationship between the two; the 
EPA insisted that natural variability allowed it to do this); id. at 882-83 (holding that the 
EPA must consider nontechnology factors if they are present; the EPA argued for 
consideration of deliberate steps only). 
180.See id. at 883 (noting that only one of the five issues on appeal is not controlled by 
either Cement Kiln or National Lime II). 
181.See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. Even though the court chastised the 
agency in its 2000 National Lime II decision for adopting “no controls” for specific toxic 
chemicals for which the best performing industry had not demonstrated technological 
processes for limiting emissions, National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 
the EPA did precisely this same thing again in both the brick kiln and plywood rules, see, 
e.g., Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883; Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1371. The 
EPA’s inability to credibly make arguments in its defense led it to agree to withdraw that 
portion of the plywood rule that adopted a “no control” floor without requiring the court to 
rule on the issue. Id. (EPA requested a remand of its rule following Sierra Club II to the 
extent that EPA had failed to establish emission standards for listed HAPS).  The other 
two issues on which the EPA’s rule failed at Step One—its risk-based exception and its 
effort to provide extensions on the statute’s compliance scheme in ways that had no 
statutory justifications—appear sufficiently out of line with the clear terms of the statute 
that one wonders whether they were the product of higher-level political decision making. 
See infra note 191 and accompanying text.  
182.Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d at 883. 
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further subdividing industry groups in ways that impose fewer 
controls on certain subsets of industry.183 Thus, while some of the 
courts’ holdings do seem to impose hard legal constraints on the 
EPA, the agency in at least some cases seems to minimize the 
impact of precedent on its preferred course of action.184  
 The EPA’s occasional irreverence toward precedent does not 
appear to be unique to the air toxic rules.185 In other regulatory 
settings, agencies have explicitly nonacquiesced to binding 
precedent, although this occurs most often in intercircuit splits.186 
                                                 
183.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland 
Cement Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,140, 21,144, 21,148 (proposed 
May 6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (discussing the permissibility and 
advantages of subcategorizing industries to provide for higher emission standards for 
some groups of industry and avoid shutdowns that might otherwise result from a single 
emission standard, and citing Judge Williams’s concurrence as endorsement of this 
approach); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0051-
2102, IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRICK MACT DECISION ON EPA’S DISCRETION IN SETTING 
MACT FLOORS 1, 15, 29 (Jan. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0051-2102 
(identifying the flexibility remaining after the Brick MACT decision, particularly with 
regard to accounting for variability among firms in setting emission standards). This move 
may be further emboldened by Judge Williams in his concurrence in Sierra Club II. 479 
F.3d at 885 (“[Although] authority to generate subcategories is obviously not unqualified 
.... one legitimate basis for creating additional subcategories must be the interest in 
keeping the relation between ‘achieved’ and ‘achievable’ in accord with common sense and 
the reasonable meaning of the statute.”) (Williams, J., concurring). 
184.Another interesting question that this Study does not explore is why the EPA seems 
inclined to promulgate industry-leaning rules in these cases. There are many possible 
answers that, again, likely vary among rules and presidential administrations. One 
possibility is that some of the courts’ demands that require more stringent emission 
standards may prove so costly that the EPA is concerned about a litigation backlash from 
industry on multiple subissues associated with those more stringent standards. Thus the 
EPA may be trading a litigation loss to public interest groups against litigation losses to 
industry. Given the evidence on the engagement and resources of these two groups, the 
EPA may generally find it more cost-effective to assume that industry will sue, and, as a 
result, it leans in their direction even when the case law seems to suggest differently. Cf. 
HUME, supra note , at 73 (reporting on how agency officials comply with court rulings to 
avoid future litigation, which in turn assumes that the successful group in the first case 
will likely be a repeat player in subsequent rules). 
185.The view that the courts would not be able to control agency discretion is one that has 
been held for a number of decades. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE 27-28, 215-16 (1971); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 265 (1968). 
186.See HUME, supra note , at 92 (“Nonacquiescence occurs when an agency applies a 
court decision only to the parties who participated in the original litigation, refusing to 
treat the case as binding precedent in subsequent proceedings”); id. at 77-78 (discussing 
how agencies interpret unwelcome judicial opinions as narrowly as possible and 
sometimes view a court opinion as just part of an ongoing dialogue); Meazell, supra note , 
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In these cases, agencies take litigation risks to advance their 
preferred policies.187 Moreover, although nonacquiescence tends 
to be discussed in the literature as a problem that needs to be 
fixed,188 it may simply be an institutional fact of life that suggests 
that the courts’ role is often secondary to political considerations 
and that this subsidiary role will be difficult to alter.189  
 Even more telling in assessing the impact of adverse court 
opinions on the EPA’s behavior is evidence of explicit legal risk 
taking by the EPA. In its plywood and composite rules, for 
example, EPA seemed to fully appreciate that a particularly novel 
interpretation of the statute—creating a low-risk exemption for 
major sources190—was legally vulnerable under the plain 
language of the statute, but it concluded it was worth the risk 
given the extralegal gains, such as political and economic 
benefits, if the approach survived in final form.191 The court 
unanimously held that the exemption was “plainly prohibited”: 
                                                                                                                 
at 1782-83 (discussing cases in which the agency effectively ignored the courts’ adverse 
rulings). 
187.See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note , at 2250-51 (describing how “judicial review 
is ... an imperfect oversight tool” given the ability of an agency to ignore or distinguish 
precedent that is in conflict with its policy or related objectives); see also Frederick 
Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 
769, 770, 786-88, 797-801 (2010) (modeling some of the variables that affect and constrain 
official action and discussing the limited impediments imposed by the law in many 
circumstances). 
188.See, e.g., Modesitt, supra note , at 953; see also Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, 
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to 
Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 803 (1990). 
189.See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note , at 2250-51 (concluding that courts enjoy 
only limited control over agencies). 
190.See Final Rule on National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: 
Plywood Industry and Composite Wood Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,946, 45,953-54 (July 30, 
2004) (construing § 122(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act as allowing the agency to remove 
subcategories of HAP sources from the list of sources subject to MACT standards). 
Although § 122(c)(9)(B) only refers to the ability to delete “any source category from the 
list” if it meets certain criteria, the EPA relied on the mention of the word “subcategories” 
in § 122(c)(9)(B)(ii) in its interpretation of the CAA. Id. at 45,946. 
191.See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0201, RISK IN 
MACT: BRIEFING FOR ACTING ADMINISTRATOR MARIANNE L. HORINKO (Oct. 6, 2003), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-
0201; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0208, SETTING 
HAZARD INDEX LIMITS-BRIEFING FOR DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JOHNSON, available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0208; U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0207, PLYWOOD AND 
COMPOSITE WOOD PRODUCTS MACT AND TURBINES MACT: USING RISK TO DELIST CERTAIN 
SUBCATEGORIES - BRIEFING FOR ADMINISTRATOR LEVITT (Jan. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/ #!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2003-0048-0207. 
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“Whatever factors EPA might properly consider for 
subcategorization, it has no authority to create a low-risk 
subcategory scheme that allows harmful emissions in a manner 
contrary to Congress’s statutory scheme.”192 Yet the possibility of 
judicial reversal did not deter the EPA from adopting this legally 
risky experiment.193 
 In their study of the judicial review of EPA rules during the 
1990’s, Professors Glicksman and Schroeder similarly identify 
several legally tenuous rules that EPA promulgated in order to 
advance certain policy preferences.194 They conclude that the 
“EPA may have incentives to proceed with some interpretations 
of statutes even when it believes them to be erroneous. A 
particular interpretation may be necessary to satisfy an 
important constituency, for example.”195  
 The limited role of the courts in affecting the agency’s decision-
making process, in fact, makes sense when viewed from a 
broader, institutional vantage point.196 Agencies have several 
masters and the courts may be less threatening than other 
sources of pressure.197 Even when an agency receives clear 
directions from the court, it may not always comply with the 
court’s ruling when the prospect of reversal is outweighed by 
other factors—like politics or ideology. The legal malleability of 
most rulemakings, moreover, likely allows a creative agency to 
identify at least some alternative paths around problematic 
                                                 
192.Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
193.Id. 
194.Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note , at 10387 (discussing rules for which “EPA had 
strong policy preferences that it chose to pursue even though the arguments that its 
authorizing statute could be interpreted to allow that pursuit were extremely weak.” And 
noting further that it seemed clear in these casesethat the “EPA’s lawyers knew they were 
advancing weak arguments”). 
195.Id. at 10,377-78; see also id. at 10,379-83 (elaborating on some of these tensions 
between agency policies and statutory directions using individual cases). 
196.The ideology of the agency or even the appointees themselves seems an important 
determinant in the agency’s receptivity to court rulings. See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 87 
(reporting that the “more strongly the FCC and FERC disagree with case outcomes ..., the 
less likely they are to change their policies”). 
197.See, e.g., id., supra note , at 74 (quoting from interviews with agency officials who 
acknowledge the influence that politics may have on agency rulemaking, even when it may 
leave the agency vulnerable to appeal); Mashaw, supra note , at 19-20 (discussing the 
simultaneous and sometimes conflicting accountability checks imposed at once by the 
courts and the President on agencies). 
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precedent.198 As Professor Mashaw has noted, it is difficult to 
squeeze the discretion out of the agencies.199  
 There are other, more mundane reasons why the impact of the 
courts’ precedent may not always  constrain the EPA’s discretion 
in the air toxic rules. First, while some of the courts’ 
interpretations are relatively unambiguous, other issues decided 
by the courts allow more wiggle room for interpretation.200 For 
example, in Mossville Environmental Action Now v. EPA, the 
court permitted the EPA to consider the variability among all 
sources in setting emissions reductions for PVC manufacturers,201 
but when the EPA attempted to rely on Mossville to make 
similar, variability-based estimates for the brick kiln industry, 
the court vacated the rule because the EPA failed to produce 
evidence showing that the variability of the worst-performing 
sources was indicative of the variability of the best-performing 
sources.202 The court’s elaboration in 2007 on the implicit 
requirements of its 2004 holding in Mossville is logical,203 yet the 
EPA’s alternate, more literal application of the 2004 holding is 
                                                 
198.Cf. id., at 10,377 (discussing how the EPA may choose to “eschew rulemaking” to 
avoid statutory language that is clearly contrary to its desired action). 
199.See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 154 (1997) (“Squeezing discretion out of a statutory-administrative 
system is indeed so difficult that one is tempted to posit a ‘Law of Conservation of 
Administrative Discretion.’”). 
200.In promulgating the Portland Cement emission standard challenged in National Lime 
II, the EPA also relied heavily on a 1999 opinion in justifying its decision, later vacated, to 
base emission standards on technology achievable by the industry in the most adverse 
circumstances and in setting “no control” standards for individual HAPs when the best 
industry was not controlling emissions for these air toxics. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 
F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Final Rule on National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,910, 31,915 
(June 14, 1999). The National Lime II court disagreed with the EPA’s 1999 interpretation 
of its Sierra Club opinion. See 233 F.3d 625, 629, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
201.370 F.3d 1232, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[E]ach [source] must meet the [specified] 
standard every day and under all operating conditions.”). The court further agreed that in 
that case the worst performing sources’ variability was indicative of the variability among 
best-performing sources. Id. 
202.Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[The EPA] has failed to show 
[as it did in Mossville] that the emission levels achieved by the worst performers using a 
given pollution control device actually predict the range of emission levels achieved by the 
best performers using that device.”).  
203.The 2004 Mossville opinion discusses the EPA’s factual support for its approach to 
estimating variability. 370 F.3d at 1242. Yet in this portion of the opinion, the court does 
not explicitly define the factual predicates that apply to extrapolation from limited data 
regarding variability, thus leaving room for ambiguous and varying interpretations of the 
ruling. Id. 
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also legally plausible. Thus, some of the EPA’s violations appear 
traceable to credible legal differences in interpreting and 
applying the courts’ precedent, rather than to nonacquiescence. 
Gaps and ambiguities in the court opinions are particularly 
inevitable for a complex standard-setting project like the air toxic 
rules.204 In fact, the D.C. Circuit itself admitted that some of its 
holdings might be limited to the unique details of the individual 
air toxic rules:  
 
This court has adopted an “every tub on its own bottom” 
approach to EPA’s setting of standard pursuant to the CAA, 
under which the adequacy of the underlying justification 
offered by the agency is the pertinent factor—not what the 
agency did on a different record concerning a different 
industry.205 
 
 Second, at least a few of the court opinions that remand the 
EPA’s HAPs rules have limited precedential effect because they 
are fact specific. The court’s decision in Arteva reversing an air 
toxics rule because of EPA’s failed to document the 
reasonableness of a mandatory monitoring requirement, for 
example, offers virtually no guidelines for other air toxic rules.206 
Though most of the court rulings are not this fact-specific, when 
they are, the resulting decisions offer little precedential guidance. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court’s strongest 
and most thorough opinions were issued in 2007,207 after about 
90% of the air toxic standards had already been promulgated as 
final and the opportunity for appealing them had passed.208 Thus, 
the bulk of the court’s most important rulings in terms of the 
statutory interpretation of section 112 of the Clean Air Act were 
published at a point in time when their influence was, in practice, 
necessarily limited.209  
                                                 
204.See, e.g., Cross, supra note , at 1278-81 (predicting that this inevitability would be one 
of the many drawbacks of judicial review). 
205.Sierra Club I, 353 F.3d 976, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
206.Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
207.See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sierra 
Club II, 479 F.3d at 884. 
208.See infra Appendix 3. 
209.The court issued one important decision regarding statutory interpretation in 2000 in 
National Lime II, after more than one-third of the rules had been promulgated. 233 F.3d 
625, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This decision held the EPA’s interpretation of the statute as 
allowing “no control” of some HAPs was invalid. Id. at 633. The court’s ruling should have 
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 Viewed skeptically, court precedent in the air toxic rules may 
place only a few limited constraints on the EPA’s interpretation of 
the statute in setting air toxic emission standards, and by no 
means does this body of cases serve as an insurmountable barrier 
to the EPA persevering with its preferred policy on a number of 
issues. If the courts are hamstrung in their ability to advance the 
public interest in cases where they conclude that an agency’s 
interpretation is not in keeping with the statute, then it is worth 
investigating whether there are also downsides associated with 
judicial review that may inadvertently undermine public interest 
protections.  
 
C. Some of the Unintended Costs to the Public Interest from 
Judicial Review 
 
 It is well known that judicial review may affect agency 
rulemakings in unintended ways that ultimately impair the 
courts’ and even the agency’s ability to advance the public 
interest.210 These costs, when added to the more limited gains, 
could mean that the courts’ net effect on advancement of the 
public interest is negative rather than positive. To simplify the 
identification of these unintended side effects, the courts’ opinions 
are assumed to be beyond reproach as a legal and policy matter, 
thus removing at least one possible complication from 
consideration.211 Ossification is also not tested in these rules 
because, as mentioned, all the rules are promulgated under 
statutory deadlines and the vast majority of these deadlines are 
backed by judicial decrees.212 
 Despite the significant narrowing of the possible unintended 
side effects arising from judicial review, at least three types of 
                                                                                                                 
in theory constrained the agency in setting the remaining standards, but as discussed 
above, the agency seemed to consciously ignore the court’s ruling and was held in violation 
of that same issue in two subsequent remands in 2007. See supra notes 176-80 and 
accompanying text. With the exception of this one issue decided in 2000, there were no 
opinions that remanded the EPA’s standard-setting based on flawed statutory 
interpretation until 2007, after 90% of the standards were promulgated as final. See infra 
Appendix 3.  
210.See Cross, supra note , at 1311 (noting that judicial review tends to encourage 
adversarial and dishonest dealings that adversely affect rule-making process). 
211.For a discussion of some of the possible flaws in the court’s opinions themselves, see 
generally MELNICK, supra note . 
212.See McGarity, supra note  at 1385-86 (describing ossification); supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
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costs in the air toxic rules may undermine the ability of the 
courts to advance the public interest. The first and most obvious 
cost results from the delay associated with a court challenge.213 
With respect to reaching a final judgment, each of the judicial 
challenges of the seven rules added two years, on average, to the 
rule-making process.214 Additional delays occurred in the EPA’s 
repair of remanded rules, in some cases leaving no federal 
standards in place for years while the details of these revised 
rules are being worked out.215 Such litigation-related delays 
benefit industry at the expense of the public interest, at least in 
protective standard setting. Indeed, this lopsided feature of 
litigation may be used strategically by regulated parties to gain 
additional concessions from the agency.216  
 A second, related cost arising from judicial review involves 
substantive and resource drains associated with the agency’s 
negotiation of rule-making petitions. Rule-making settlements 
are reached after a final rule is promulgated, but before an appeal 
to the court, in order to limit the risks of a remand and minimize 
the delays and related agency drains associated with judicial 
                                                 
213.See Cross, supra note , at 1313-14 (expressing concern that the diversion of resources 
to respond to and defend against litigation may not be justified by the benefits that 
judicial review adds to the process). 
214.See infra Appendix 1. 
215.See supra Part III.B.1. 
216.For example, Professors Owen and Braeutigam suggest in their “Strategies for 
Established Firms and Industries” ways to game the EPA: 
The delay which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to undertake 
other measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision. These 
measures include strategic innovation, legislative proposals, and lobbying activity. If the 
administrative process goes on long enough, it is even possible to ask for a new hearing on 
the grounds that new and more accurate information may be available. The agency 
usually cannot resist the effort to delay through exhaustion of process because this would 
be grounds for reversal on appeal to the courts. OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note , at 4-5. 
By contrast, environmental groups often see delay as a window during which health is not 
sufficiently protected. See, e.g., RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 262 (3d ed. 1997) (observing that “[t]ime delays often benefit the corporate 
interests while creating a disadvantage for consumer groups” and linking this not only to 
regulatory consequences but to the costs of engaging in the process). Though the EPA’s 
standards may be a disappointment, further delaying their implementation could be 
worse. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note , at 1772 (“Increased procedural formalities [like 
judicial review] may work to the disadvantage of public interest groups by exhausting 
their limited resources and providing organized interests a basis for delaying agency 
enforcement actions.”); cf. MASHAW, supra note  , at 174 (noting that the timing of review 
and associated compliance costs affect a party’s stake in challenging a rule in court). 
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review.217 While agency resources dedicated to rule-making 
settlements are likely to be less taxing administratively than 
revising rules on remand, these settlements still appear to 
demand considerable agency resources in some cases.218  
 The cement kiln rule provides an illustration of these resource 
drains. See Figure 4.  After the final rule was promulgated in 
1999, a group of industries threatened to raise a separate set of 
challenges against the rule in the D.C. Circuit.219 The EPA 
ultimately settled this batch of industry claims, which involved 
twenty-four discrete changes to the rule, but the settlement was 
neither simple nor quick.220 Similarly, in an unrelated rule 
governing PET manufacturers, the EPA made a series of 
concessions over a five-year period in response to industry’s 
petitions for reconsideration.221 Presumably the agency hoped to 
mollify the industry’s concerns through these negotiations. The 
EPA’s concessions ultimately proved insufficient to prevent 
litigation, and yet the process of repeat reconsideration of the rule 
undoubtedly took a toll on agency resources.  
 
Figure 4: Chronology of EPA’s Effort To Settle Rule-Making 
Claims with the American Portland Cement Alliance, 
Comprised Exclusively of Regulated Parties 
 
                                                 
217.See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 
1241, 1245-48 (1985) (discussing rule-making settlements). 
218.See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1368-69 (1997) 
(debating the benefits of regulatory negotiation). 
219.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Portland Cement 
Manufacturing Industry, 67 Fed. Reg. 16,614, 16,615 (Apr. 5, 2002) (amending previous 
rule which had been challenged by the American Portland Cement Alliance). 
220.See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Portland Cement 
Manufacturing Industry, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,371, 44,371 (July 2, 2002) (discussing how 
seventeen provisions agreed to in the settlement did not receive adverse comment but 
seven amendments did receive adverse comment and were thus withdrawn); see also infra 
Figure 4. 
221.Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Specifically, industry petitioned the EPA twice and each petition led to some budging by 
EPA—first a public hearing and then amendments to the rule. See National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Group IV Polymers and Resins, 64 Fed. Reg. 
30,456, 30,456-58 (June 8, 1999); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutant Emissions: Group IV: Polymers and Resins, 66 Fed. Reg. 40,903, 40,903 (Aug. 6, 
2001). 
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 Indeed, because these settlements are sometimes secret, the 
extent to which post-rule settlements drain agency resources is 
difficult to estimate.222 From the information available in the air 
toxic rules, it appears that the EPA engaged in a significant level 
of post-final rule petition activity. At least one-third of the ninety 
rules triggered petitions for reconsideration or notices of 
appeal.223 Because most of these petitions did not lead to an 
appeal resulting in judgment, moreover, it appears that at least 
some of the rules were settled rather than voluntarily withdrawn 
by interest group challengers.224 
 Finally, judicial review may impose invisible, but potentially 
more significant, costs on the agency by creating incentives for 
the agency to compromise substantive features of the rules in an 
effort to minimize the threat of appeals. For example, the agency 
might make changes preemptively in its final or even in its 
proposed rule in response to comments that raise a credible 
threat of litigation, unless there are countervailing agency 
                                                 
222.Some and perhaps most of the settlements and negotiations are not recorded in the 
rule docket or published in the Federal Register, so their prevalence and resource 
demands remain largely mysterious. See, e.g., Gaba, supra note , at 1254 (discussing 
potential secrecy of rule-making settlements). 
223.See infra Appendix 2. 
224.See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 130 (discussing the fact that the number of 
petitions filed by industry exceeds the number of appeals filed by the same). 
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policies that are too significant to ignore.225 Indeed, if the agency 
is intent on getting a rule through the process expeditiously, it 
may work closely with the litigious groups throughout the 
development of the rule in an effort to neutralize their 
opposition.226 Mollifying litigious groups during rule development 
or during the comment process could go a long way to lower the 
agency’s litigation risks.  
 The effect of these litigation-based incentives on agency 
behavior is well accepted in administrative law.227 As Professor 
Strauss observes, “the very act of being hauled into court and 
required to defend its action involves considerable costs [to the 
agency].... Hence, parties who are capable of imposing such costs 
at the end of the regulatory process become parties whose 
interests must be reckoned with at the regulatory process.”228 
This influence likely occurs during multiple points of the process, 
moreover, including the development of the proposed rule, the 
notice-and-comment process, and further clarifications, 
amendments, or other addenda to a final rule after it is 
published. An attorney steeped in administrative process expands 
on this view based on his personal experience: 
 
The reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-
reasoned technical comments.... [is] not only because they 
want to appear to be reasonable and responsive to public 
comments, but also because their willingness to refine a 
regulatory program—to address identified flaws in the 
program—should help that program withstand judicial 
review.229 
 
 Yet if the EPA truly seeks to minimize its litigation risks by 
giving higher priority to comments that raise appealable issues, 
then the more litigious and heavily engaged groups are likely to 
                                                 
225.See id. at 131 (discussing this possibility). 
226.See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 79, at 1380-83 (discussing the importance of the rule 
development process to minimizing litigation risks for an agency). 
227.See, e.g., id. at 1387-88 (recounting some literature on this point). 
228.PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1121 (9th ed. 
1995). 
229.Andrea Bear Field & Kathy E.B. Robb, EPA Rulemakings: Views from Inside and 
Outside, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1990, at 9, 50 (quoting an experienced 
administrative law attorney in D.C.). 
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enjoy greater influence in EPA rules.230 In the case of the EPA’s 
air toxic rules, these more engaged groups are likely to be 
industry, in part because they possess superior access to the 
relevant information and in part because the complexity and 
technicality of the rules may impede participation by more thinly 
financed groups.231  
 To the extent that industry dominance corresponds with 
credible threats of litigation, which in turn translates into greater 
influence over the substance of the final rules, however, judicial 
review may be setting back protection of the public health rather 
than advancing it, at least on balance. Besieged by dozens of 
litigatable issues by industry, and only a few, if any, by public 
interest groups, the agency will find itself substantively leaning 
toward industry simply to survive judicial oversight. As one EPA 
official remarked with respect to the heavy involvement of 
industry in the rule-development stage: “We help them; they help 
us.”232  
 These predicted disparities in participation and influence in 
fact occurred in the EPA’s air toxic rules and with relatively 
significant levels of imbalance and input. Just during the 
development of the proposed rules, industry had more than eighty 
informal communications, on average, with the EPA, as compared 
with fewer than one communication, on average, for the public 
interest groups for these same rules.233 See Table 2. Industry also 
                                                 
230.See, e.g., MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 64-
65 (1995) (noting how affected interest groups who wield the threat of litigation enjoy 
enhanced power over rulemakings); WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 188 
(1985) (arguing how judicial review may be used as a lever by industry to gain concessions 
from an agency); Philip K. Howard, Keynote Address: Administrative Procedure and the 
Decline of Responsibility, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 312, 318 (1996) (“[T]he power is held by 
interest groups and others who can afford the lawyers to play the process and go to the 
courts.”); Mashaw, supra note , at 17 (“Judicial review ... gives important legal armaments 
to obstructionist elements in the agencies’ regulatory space. Every rule is contestable on a 
host of possible legal and factual grounds and a reviewing court’s reaction to these 
complaints is often unpredictable.”); see also Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting 
Judicial Review of Labor Board Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 270-79 
(1987) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of judicial review of NLRB decisions); 
cf. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 36 (1938) (noting that “the umpire 
theory of administering law” is not likely to prevail because of the skew in resources 
among affected parties). 
231.See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 79, at 1380-88. 
232.Coglianese, supra note , at 14. 
233.See infra Appendix 2. There is no readily available record of the extent of pre-NPRM 
negotiations occurring on the early Clean Water Act standards, but one gets a sense from 
the Coggins & McGarity account that this early exchange during the rule-making process 
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dominated the comment process with about seventeen industry 
comments for every one public interest group comment. For more 
than half the rules, moreover, public interest groups did not 
provide even a single comment.234 Even if the agency is otherwise 
inclined to favor public interest groups, the incentives created by 
litigation could lead agency staff to err on the side of appeasing 
the most vocal groups in order to get a rule finalized in a 
reasonable time frame.235  
 Even more to the point, this imbalance in at least comment 
activity appears to be taking a toll on the substance of the 
resulting rules. The air toxic rules got weaker from the proposed 
to final version: 82% of the changes the EPA made to the final 
rule, on average, involved weakening it in some way, and the 
number of industry commenters significantly correlated with the 
number of changes that the EPA made to weaken a rule—about 
one weakening change for every two industry commenters.236 No 
similar correlation exists between the public interest comments 
and changes made to strengthen the rule.237 Industry also filed 
more petitions for reconsideration against air toxic rules as 
compared with public interest groups, even though it took only 
one of these petitions to judgment.238  
 This imbalanced participation and influence by industry in the 
EPA’s air toxic rules occurred consistently across both the Clinton 
and George W. Bush administrations.239 While the data reveal 
                                                                                                                 
was quite limited. See Coggins & McGarity, supra note , at 9 (discussing agency reticence 
to heed industry criticisms and agency tendency, in some cases, to outright ignore industry 
criticisms). This noncommunication during rule development may in fact explain the high 
rate of industry challenges that resulted in appellate decisions under the Clean Water Act 
and the nearly mirror image of challenges, brought almost exclusively by environmental 
groups, for otherwise similar HAPs technology-based standards, which appear to have 
been crafted after several years of intensive negotiations and discussions with industry 
before the agency even issued the proposed rule.  
234.See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.  
235.See, e.g., Cross, supra note , at 1315-22 (discussing the skew in favor of regulated 
parties more generally as an adverse side effect of judicial review). But see Funk, supra 
note , at 1386 (In contrast to negotiated rulemaking, “the agency still determines the 
public interest. Modern rulemaking has not substituted interest representation theory for 
traditional notions of administrative rulemaking.”). 
236.Wagner et al., supra note 9, at 135 (reporting a correlation coefficient of 0.54 between 
industry commenters and changes made to weaken the final rule, which was statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level). 
237.Id. 
238.Id. at 129 (providing a data table on this point). 
239.See, e.g., Katherine Barnes, Wendy Wagner & Lisa Peters, Presidential Politics Meets 
Regulatory Complexity: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous Air Pollutant Rules 
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little about the significance of the individual changes made to 
weaken rules, they do indicate that both the Clinton and Bush 
EPAs were very receptive to informal contacts with industry and 
that both EPAs weakened the rules in response to comments at 
roughly the same rate.240 Moreover, and as mentioned previously, 
more than half of the rules appealed to the courts were drafted in 
principle by the Clinton EPA.241 Nevertheless, the Bush EPA was 
present through all of the judicial remands and is thus primarily 
responsible for the EPA’s delays in repairing the rules, as well as 
for some of the more egregious forms of nonacquiescence and 
legal risk taking evidenced in the two 2007 cases.242 
                                                                                                                 
Under Clinton and Bush II, at 14-15 (July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641551. 
240.See id. at 16-17. 
241.See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
242.See infra Appendix 1. 
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 Table 2: Interest Group Engagement and Influence in 
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of rules) 






 This additional evidence of extensive exchanges between the 
agency and industry brings new meaning to the dazzling 
litigation successes of the public interest groups. If industry is in 
fact enjoying substantial victories during the rule-making 
process, then its failure to appeal may simply reflect the fact that 
it has few issues of substance left to litigate. Certainly industry’s 
failure to appeal rules is not due to the fact that it lacks standing 
to sue, nor does it seem likely, after such heavy engagement in 
the rule development and comment process, that industry lacks 
resources to press claims through to litigation.245  
                                                 
243.Note that the litigated rules fall within one standard deviation of this mean on 
virtually all measures. See infra Appendix 2. 
244.It is assumed that changes weakening the rule are attributable to industry and 
changes strengthening the rule are attributable to public interest groups. It is likely that 
there in fact is not always a one-to-one match, so as a result, the quantitative data do not 
correlate precisely to interest groups on this variable. In further research, the actual 
comments of industry and public interest groups will be coded to determine the reliability 
of this assumption. 
245.As mentioned earlier, the scarcity of appeals from industry is a surprise. A number of 
administrative law scholars discuss how the cost-benefit analysis of challenging agency 
rules in court should lead to greater use of the courts by industry rather than by the public 
interest groups. See, e.g., Cross, supra note , at 1255 (observing the benefits of judicial 
review to regulated parties because they “can at minimum defer these [compliance] costs 
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 At the same time, public interest groups may be the primary 
litigant for this same reason: because industry enjoyed a 
disproportionate influence in the rule-making process. The fact 
that the courts identified multiple flaws with the EPA’s 
interpretation of the statute from the perspective of the public 
interest lends still more support to the possibility that the rules 
emerging from this skewed process are tilted too far toward 
industry.246 
 To the extent that judicial review is undermining the public 
interest in a significant subset of rules, however, a paradox 
emerges. On the one hand, the courts appear to be an important, 
and perhaps the only, institutional tool available to hold the 
complex but wrong-headed rules up to the public light once they 
are challenged.247 On the other hand, the courts may offer the 
most resourceful participants still greater legal leverage than 
they already enjoy, particularly for rules that are devoid of public 
interest engagement.248 The final part of this Article takes up this 
paradox in more detail. 
 
IV. REVISITING THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON AGENCY 
RULEMAKINGS 
 
 The interaction between the courts, the EPA, and interest 
groups in the entire set of air toxic rules defies simple 
generalization. At one end of the spectrum, some of the air toxic 
rules epitomize the operation of the interest group representation 
model in its full glory. In these rules, all affected interests engage 
intensely in the rule-making process, and their participation, 
                                                                                                                 
for perhaps years while the issue is litigated”); see also MASHAW, supra note , at 186 
(“[T]he current structure of preenforcement review skews the incentives of participants 
fairly strongly in the direction of litigation rather than compliance.”). The greater 
resources, coupled with the benefits of delaying protective rules regardless of the 
likelihood of winning on the merits, combine to create strong incentives for regulated 
parties to hold up rules as long as possible in the courts. See, e.g., Schuck & Elliott, supra 
note , at 1011-12 (discussing how the delays associated with appeals and remands provide 
incentives to appeal even when the probability of prevailing on the merits is substantially 
less than fifty-fifty). 
246.See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
247.Cf. Cross, supra note , at 1274-75 (discussing the arguments that favor agencies over 
courts in terms of accountability). 
248.See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. 
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particularly through judicial review, makes at least some 
difference to the final rules that emerge.249  
 At the other end of the spectrum, a sizable number of rules 
exemplify the traditional model of judicial review characteristic of 
the mid-1900s. In this set of rules, regulated parties are the 
exclusive participants in the rule-making process and appear to 
engage primarily in order to protect their rights against arbitrary 
regulation.250  
 These two different models of interest group engagement in the 
air toxic rule-making process yield contrasting results with 
regard to the ability of judicial review to advance the public 
interest. In this Section, the two models are explored further. The 
analysis then closes with some general questions that arise with 
regard to the courts’ influence, regardless of the diversity of 
interest group engagement. 
 
A. Interest Group Representation Model 
 
 The litigated cases challenging the EPA’s air toxic emission 
standards exemplify the critical role judicial review plays in 
advancing the public interest. Public interest groups brought six 
of the seven cases challenging the EPA’s air toxic emission 
standards and won all but one of their appeals.251 In two of the 
opinions, both decided by a panel that had more Republican- than 
Democrat-appointed judges,252 the court berated the EPA for a 
series of interpretive errors that the court held violated its 
statutory mandate in ways that undermined public health 
protection.253 On most of the issues for which the EPA’s rules 
were vacated and remanded, moreover, the courts found that the 
EPA had not only ignored its statutory limits but had also 
ignored the courts’ own precedent. As one of the panels concluded: 
“The agency’s errors could not be more serious insofar as it acted 
                                                 
249.See supra Part III.A.1. 
250.This one-sided engagement by regulated industry occurs despite clear public health 
implications of the rules promulgated by the EPA. See supra note 232 and accompanying 
text. 
251.See supra Part III.A.1. 
252.See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
253.See generally Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sierra 
Club II, 479 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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unlawfully, which is more than sufficient reason to vacate the 
rules.”254 
 The end result of these public interest victories was a series of 
court opinions that constrain the EPA’s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act in ways that advance public health protection. 
When the EPA attempted to implement a large exemption 
process in a section of the Clean Air Act that did not contemplate 
such a loophole, the court intervened to block the maneuver.255 
When the EPA declined to set standards for certain toxins 
because the best-performing industries were not voluntarily 
installing pollution-control devices to limit their emissions, the 
court demanded that the EPA reconsider and find a way to 
regulate the uncontrolled emissions.256 Without judicial review, 
these types of problematic EPA interpretations would have been 
promulgated as binding rules.257  
 The public interest group victories in the appeals of the air 
toxic standards, particularly when set against the continuous 
industry presence in the rules, leave little doubt that the interest 
group representation model is alive and well.258 The courts serve 
as critical watchdogs.259 Indeed, EPA staff may have celebrated 
                                                 
254.Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1374. 
255.See id. at 1371-73. 
256.See supra note 177. 
257.See Sargentich, supra note , at 641 (arguing exactly this attribute of courts in 
preventing the worst abuses of agencies by applying “law-governed checks by 
decisionmakers not affected by the same political or institutional pressures facing 
executive branch officers”). 
258.The case governing HAPs rules for brick kilns may be even more egregious in evincing 
signs of possible capture of the EPA by industry. The proposed rule contained a number of 
seemingly illegal decisions, including not only the five that were subject to condemnation 
by the court on appeal, see Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875; see also infra Appendix 2, but also 
one proposal the EPA dropped in the final rule because of comments—the same risk-based 
exemption that ultimately failed in the plywood litigation., see National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products 
Manufacturing; and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay 
Ceramics Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,706 (May 16, 2003) (explaining the 
EPA’s decision to not include a risk-based exemption in the final rule based on comments 
received); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1372 (striking down this risk-
based exemption in the plywood rule). What cannot be told from these cases given the 
small percentage of rules subject to litigation, however, is whether the cases are 
exceptional or instead generally representative of the larger set of HAPs rules.  
259.From the standpoint of thinly financed public interest groups, moreover, filing 
comments and then appealing problematic rules may offer a more affordable means of 
participating than engaging in extensive, informal negotiations with the agency 
throughout the rule-making process. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1771. Given the heavy 
involvement of industry, see infra Appendix 2, it would seem quite costly for the public 
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the judicial remands and reversals in all of these public interest 
suits since at least a few of the EPA’s legally invalidated 
decisions appeared to stem from politics, rather than from a good 
faith interpretation of the statute by EPA career staff.260  
 Reinforcing the public interest benefits to judicial review are 
several secondary attributes of the courts’ oversight that are not 
apparent from the data, but may be just as important. Ex ante, 
the prospect of judicial review likely forced the agency to be 
clearer about its decision-making process, particularly the 
changes it made to the proposed rule. When it did not provide this 
kind of explanatory backdrop to the courts’ satisfaction, the EPA 
faced a risk of having its rule remanded for further 
explanation.261 In the air toxic emission standards, in fact, three 
of the seven remands were based in part on insufficient support 
or explanation.262 If the agency is able to provide this type of 
explanation without incurring other types of countervailing 
political costs, then the courts’ review provides useful motivation 
for the agency to publish a more accessible and transparent rule. 
 Additional transparency benefits also accrue ex post, after the 
rulemaking is briefed and resolved by the court. The courts’ 
opinions make the agency’s foibles more accessible to a broader 
audience, allowing political and related forces to sanction and 
discipline the agency.263 In his study of the effects of court 
opinions on agency behavior, Professor Hume discusses how court 
rulings can trigger press coverage and political pressure that in 
turn shine a much brighter light on agency decisions.264 The 
briefing process even helps the parties themselves focus their 
                                                                                                                 
interest groups to attempt to keep up with these discussions and remain a meaningful 
presence throughout.  
260.See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 74-75 (quoting agency officials who discuss how the 
courts’ rulings give ammunition to resist political pressure from the White House or 
Congress that takes the rulemaking too far out of the bounds of the statute); see also supra 
note 186-88 and accompanying text.  
261.See generally Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note , at 10,405-11 (describing a decade 
of cases in which EPA rules were remanded for failure to support the agency’s reasoning). 
262.See infra Appendix 3. The cases remanding the agency, at least in part on insufficient 
factual justification, are: Mossville Enviromental Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1242-
43 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); and National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
263.See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 738, 778-79 (2011) (making this 
argument with regard to the benefits of judicial review of agency science). 
264.See, e.g., HUME, supra note , at 118. 
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arguments in ways not encouraged earlier in the rule-making 
process.265  
 The courts’ important role as communicator and translator is 
also apparent qualitatively. See Text Box 2. The text box below 
compares the EPA’s own convoluted explanation of a contested 
issue with the much more accessible explanation provided by the 
court. While the court is grappling with only a few issues—an 
advantage that likely helps the court bring greater clarity to its 
description of the issue—the court may also face stronger 
incentives to serve as a translator as compared with the 
agency.266 When the EPA takes a position on a controversial 
issue, for example, it is likely to be attacked not only legally, but 
politically.267 One way to cope with this inevitable opposition is to 
offer up convoluted, though comprehensive, explanations that 
support the agency’s decision rather than to be clear about how it 
resolved competing policy positions. The courts, on the other 
hand, gain prestige in part by their ability to crystallize the 
contested issues and place them into sharper focus in relation to 
the statute. 
                                                 
265.Coglianese, supra note , at 160-61. One attorney even conceded that their appellate 
brief was unsuccessful in part because the brief writers had failed to do an adequate job of 
controlling information excess: the brief “was so filled with so many issues of such a 
technical nature that I think we got lost in explaining basically how simple this one [issue] 
was.” Id. at 160 (alteration in original). 
266.See, e.g., Meazell, supra note , at 780. 
267.See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note , at 184 (“The specter of administrative agencies failing 
to protect the public health and safety, as they have been ordered to do by congressional 
legislation, can often capture media attention and promote particular legislators’ personal 
goals.”); MELNICK, supra note , at 322 (describing how the agency can serve as “every 
elected official’s favorite whipping boy”). 
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Text Box 2: A Comparison of the EPA’s and the Court’s 
Description of How the EPA Determined the Best-Performing 
Facilities Within the Brick Kiln Industry  
 EPA’s Description         The Court’s Description 
Section 112(d)(3) of the CAA specifies that we set standards for 
existing sources that are no less stringent than the average 
emission limitation achieved by the best-performing 12 percent of 
existing sources (for which the Administrator has emissions 
information) where there are 30 or more sources in the category or 
subcategory. Our interpretation of average emission limitation is 
that it is a measure of central tendency, such as the arithmetic 
mean or the median. If the median is used when there are at least 
30 sources, then the emission level achievable by the source and 
its APCD that is at the bottom of the top 6 percent of the best-
performing sources (i.e., the 94th percentile) represents the MACT 
floor control level. We based our MACT floors for each BSCP 
subcategory on this interpretation. Nineteen percent (22 of 115) of 
the existing large tunnel kilns located at synthetic minor sources 
or major sources are controlled by a DLA (12), DIFF (4), DLS/FF 
(4), or WS (2). Because more than 6 percent of the large tunnel 
kilns reduce emissions by some technique, emissions reductions 
from these kilns are required under the CAA. We then considered 
which of these controls are proven to be applicable to existing 
tunnel kilns, and we ranked these kilns to determine the 
appropriate MACT emission limits. We consider the 12 DLA to be 
equivalent and believe that this type of control can be applied to 
any existing large tunnel kiln without causing potentially 
significant production problems. We consider the performance of 
all of the DLA to be equivalent because there currently are two 
types of DLA in the industry (supplied by two manufacturers), and 
we have test data for both designs that show HF removal 
efficiencies that are within 1 percent of one another. We excluded 
DIFF and DLS/FF from our ranking of controls for existing sources 
because of the reported problems caused by applying DIFF and 
DLS/FF to existing kilns. We excluded WS from our ranking of 
controls for existing sources because many facilities do not have 
proven wastewater disposal options. Therefore, we only considered 
DLA in our ranking, and accordingly, the 94th percentile source 
(the 7th best-controlled source) is a DLA-controlled kiln. 
Therefore, the MACT floors for existing large tunnel kilns are 
based on the level of control achieved by a DLA. We have DLA 
outlet test data for 7 of the 12 existing large DLA-controlled 
tunnel kilns, and therefore, we are confident that our test data are 
within the best-controlled 6 percent of sources. Furthermore, the 
single best-performing source, based on our available DLA outlet 
data, is one of the three sources for which a control efficiency is 
available. 
 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Brick and Structural Clay Manufacturing; and National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Ceramic 
Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,700 (May 16, 2003). 
As discussed above, we held in Cement Kiln 
that “EPA may not deviate from section 
7412(d)(3)’s requirement that floors reflect 
what the best performers actually achieve 
by claiming that floors must be achievable 
by all sources using MACT technology.” 255 
F.3d at 861. In setting the floor for existing 
large tunnel brick kilns, however, EPA did 
just that. [discussing and quoting from 
EPA’s rule and justification].... EPA argues 
that it has “reasonably construe[d] the term 
‘best performing’ ... to allow it to consider 
whether retrofitting kilns with a particular 
pollution control technology is technically 
feasible.” Resp’t’s Br. 27. But EPA cannot 
circumvent Cement Kiln’s holding that 
secion 7412(d)(3) requires floors based on 
the emission level actually achieved by the 
best performers (those with the lowest 
emission levels), not the emission level 
achievable by all sources, simply by 
redefining “best performing” to mean those 
sources with emission levels achievable by 
all sources. See 255 F.3d at 861. Moreover, 
EPA’s rationales for excluding kilns 
equipped with non-DLA technology from its 
ranking of the best-performing large tunnel 
kilns (the infeasibility of retrofitting all 
kilns with certain non-DLA technology and 
the negative impact other non-DLA 
technology would have on productivity) 
amount to nothing more than a concern 
about ensuring that its floor is achievable 
by all kilns in the subcategory-precisely the 
position we rejected in Cement Kiln.  
 











 Together, these judicial attributes mark the triumph of the 
interest group representation model in advancing the public 
interest. Liberalized standing rules do indeed allow public 
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interest groups to exert a meaningful presence in EPA 
rulemakings.268 And, equally importantly, the appeal process 
allows these groups to raise critical legal questions about the 
agency’s rules to the attention of the media, the public, and the 
political branches.269  
                     
B. The Traditional Model, Revisited 
 
 In contrast to the vigorous pluralistic and judicial oversight 
afforded to the air toxic standards discussed in the last Section, a 
sizable subset of air toxic standards – more than half -- involves 
no public interest participation at all.  See Figure 5. Interest 
group engagement in this subset of rules is completely one-sided: 
regulated industry effectively monopolizes the entire rule-making 
process—from rule development, to notice and comment, to filing 
petitions for reconsideration.270 
 Despite the absence of public interest engagement, the public 
interest is nevertheless directly affected by these standards. 
Every one of the EPA’s air toxic rules imposes limits on the toxic 
emissions of large industries and requires these facilities to 
reduce their pollution.271 Moreover, because the sources covered 
by the Act are “major” and emit more than ten tons per year of air 
toxins, the reductions are likely significant in quantity because 
they ultimately reduce net emissions by a considerable 
percentage.272  
 The evidence also does not suggest that the rules without 
public interest involvement were qualitatively less important to 
the public health than those that did attract public interest 
comments.273 The EPA’s toxic emission standard for PVC 
manufacturers, for example, lacked any public interest 
engagement,274 yet it required reductions of 3880 tons of 
emissions of these toxics annually, or about a 20% reduction from 
                                                 
268.See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
269.See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 
270.It is worth noting that this subset of rules constitutes the majority, 53% (N=48), of the 
EPA’s air toxic rules. See infra Figure 5. 
271.42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006). 
272.Id. § 7412(a)(1), (d)(1). 
273.See infra Appendixes 1, 2. 
274.See infra Appendix 2. 
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base levels.275 By comparison, Mossville, a case that 
environmental groups actually litigated,276 involved fewer 
emission reductions—only about 400 tons of air toxins per year—
from 28 facilities nationwide.277 Additionally, of the economically 
significant rules promulgated by the EPA, rules that might be 
expected to involve the greatest emission reductions because of 
their economic consequences, more than 35% of the rules (N=14), 
did not involve public interest group comment.278  
                                                 
275.See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET 1 (June 20, 1996), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/pr4/grivfact.pdf. 
276.The petitioners were Mossville Environmental Action Now and the Sierra Club. 
Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
277.See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note , at 1. 
278.See infra Appendixes 1, 2. 
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Figure 5: Public Interest Group Engagement in HAPs Rules 
 
 
 Thus, although all of the EPA’s air toxic rules might benefit 
from pluralistic oversight, such oversight is not occurring in the 
majority of the EPA’s air toxic emission standards.279 Instead, 
engagement by interest groups in the majority of the air toxic 
rules comes much closer to the traditional or due-process model 
common in the mid-1900s.280 In this model, courts are brought in 
exclusively by the regulated parties “to cabin administrative 
discretion within statutory bounds” and to require that “agencies 
... follow decisional procedures designed to promote the accuracy, 
rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative 
directives [with respect to their interests].”281 In its engagement 
with the air toxic rules, in fact, industry’s primary comments 
concerned the feasibility, cost, practicality, and timeline of the 
EPA’s emission standards. Industry rarely, if ever, advocated for 
greater health protection.282  
 A good illustration of this traditional or due-process model of 
administrative process is a HAPs rule that applies to polymer 
                                                 
279.See supra Figure 5. 
280.See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1669. 
281.Id. at 1670. 
282.This is based on the review of more than thirty individual industry comments filed on 
air toxic rules as well as on the larger data indicating statistical correlations between 
industry commenters and changes to the rules that weaken the rules. See infra Appendix 
2. 
Rules involving no 
public interest 
comment or litigation 
activity 
HAPs rules that public interest 
groups appealed to judgment 
HAPs rules that 
involved at least 
one comment from 
public interest 
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manufacturers. In this particular rule, the EPA proposed 
emission limits on a handful of carcinogenic air toxics emitted 
from about sixty-six plants that manufactured polyester fibers, 
soft drink bottles, and various plastic parts and toys.283 Despite 
the relatively clear public health implications for these emission 
standards, there was no public interest group participation.284 By 
contrast, industry and industry associations engaged in more 
than 450 contacts with the agency before the proposed rule was 
even published.285 At comment time, industry was again the 
dominant participant, effectively monopolizing notice and 
comment: there were thirty-six industry commenters and one 
state commenter, but not a single commenter from the public 
interest community. In response to these comments, the EPA 
made twenty changes that further weakened the rule and 
rejected only six comments.286 No significant comments were 
made urging EPA to strengthen the rule.287 Still unhappy, two 
individual industry petitioners appealed the rule to the D.C. 
Circuit, arguing that the EPA arbitrarily failed to consider the 
excessive costs of the monitoring requirements.288 In Arteva 
Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
EPA’s rule was arbitrary on this issue and vacated and remanded 
the rule to the agency in 2003.289 The court’s opinion, for which 
the panel was comprised of one Republican and two Democratic 
appointees,290 focused like a laser on the very specific factual 
complaints of the industry petitioners—namely, that evidence 
suggested that the EPA’s monitoring requirements were not cost-
effective in detecting violations from equipment leaks for all 
                                                 
283.U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note , at 1-3. 
284.See infra Appendix 2. 
285.More than 300 of these contacts were informal. See infra Appendix 2. 
286.See infra Appendix 2. 
287.See infra Appendix 2. 
288.Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1089, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
289.Id. at 1088, 1092. 
290.Circuit Judges Harry T. Edwards, Karen LeCraft Henderson, and Judith W. Rogers 
composed the panel. See id. at 1089. Judges Edwards and Rogers were Democratic 
appointees, and Judge Henderson was a Republican appointee. See Biographical Directory 
of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (search name of Judge; follow 
hyperlink to biographical page) (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). 
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affected industries, as opposed to other types of equipment—and 
found them compelling.291  
 If there are no public interest commenters available to file suit, 
the agency can ignore its mandate in ways that detrimentally 
impact the public health.292 And while the interest group 
representation model should not be interpreted literally to 
require an active public interest presence in all rules, in reality if 
public interest groups are absent from most of the rules, then the 
interest group representation model seems to poorly characterize 
what actually occurs in practice.  
 Even when the agency does attempt to advance the public 
interest based on internal ideological or political directives, the 
agency faces counter pressure from litigation-backed comments 
filed by industry, which could delay the standards for years while 
the litigation is being resolved.293 At least in the air toxic rules, 
the evidence reveals that the EPA does favor industry in the final 
rules regardless of presidential administration.294  
 Seen from this perspective, the high success rate of public 
interest groups’ appeals may simply be an indication of just how 
problematic the larger set of air toxics rules are and foreshadow 
the substantial mop-up work that the courts and public interest 
litigators have ahead of them. Recall that in rules that involve 
only industry comments and related communications, judicial 
review is available only to industry and thus advances only 
                                                 
291.Arteva, 323 F.3d at 1091. 
292.See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (setting out the 
reasons for exhausting remedies first within the agency before raising the issue with the 
court). In his study of OSHA, Patrick Schmidt documents the greater influence that 
follows the submission of comments as compared to more informal input that does not 
serve as the basis for appeal. See Patrick Schmidt, Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic 
Participation and Litigation in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking, 4 BUS. & POL. 71, 77-78 (2002). 
Obviously, however, there still can be political consequences if the agency’s violations are 
caught and found offensive to politically powerful constituents. 
293.See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
294.See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. Although the aggregate or net effect of 
these litigation pressures appears to cause the EPA to lean heavily in favor of industry, 
EPA does put up a fight in some cases. For example, the EPA rejected 18% of significant 
comments to weaken the rule, thus suggesting that litigation threats may not always be 
decisive. See infra Appendix 2. In the emission standard ultimately challenged in Arteva, 
for example, the EPA resisted weakening certain monitoring requirements, despite the 
fact that industry launched two separate petitions for reconsideration over five years. See 
supra note 218 and accompanying text. In a few rules the EPA even decided to strengthen 
a rule despite the absence of a meaningful public interest group presence during the 
comment process. See infra Appendix 2. 
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industry’s concerns.295 To the extent these industry concerns are 
mutually exclusive with advancing the public interest, an 
administrative process backed by a threat of appeal, but 
monopolized or at least dominated by industry, will thus tend to 
move the public interest goals backward, rather than forward.  
 The limited body of empirical work that traces the interest 
groups’ engagement in rulemakings is largely congenial to the 
findings reached here regarding the possibility of strong industry 
domination and influence in the majority of rules. The major 
empirical studies report that public interest groups filed 
comments in less than half of the rules under study; in the half of 
the rules that did involve diverse comments, industry was still 
the dominant participant.296 This research also shows industry 
dominance of, or at least heavy engagement in, the litigation that 
follows promulgation of a final rule.297  
                                                 
295.See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
296.See Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical 
Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 178, 187 (1992) (examining 
interest group engagement in pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding 
environmentalists participated in 49% of the cancellations); Marissa Martino Golden, 
Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 253-54 (1998) (studying eight rules promulgated by 
EPA and NHTSA, using content analysis to determine who participates and influences 
federal regulations, and finding no citizen engagement in five of the eight rules); Yackee & 
Yackee, supra note , at 131, 133 (studying forty lower-salience rulemakings promulgated 
by four different federal agencies and finding that business interests submitted 57% of 
comments, whereas nonbusiness or nongovernmental organizations submitted 22% of 
comments, of which 6% came from public interest groups); Coglianese, supra note , at 73, 
tbl.2-2 (finding that businesses participated in 96% of rules and that national 
environmental groups participated in 44%). 
297.Professor Coglianese, for example, found that industry was by far the most dominant 
challenger in filing appeals to economically significant RCRA rules between 1987 and 
1991. This was also during the Reagan administration, and public interest groups were 
doing particularly vigorous battle with the administration over hazardous waste policies. 
Specifically, about 90% of the lead plaintiffs in the appeals of the RCRA rules were 
corporations or trade associations representing industry; indeed “the dominance of 
industry groups as participants in litigation becomes even more pronounced” as compared 
with the notice-and-comment period. Coglianese, supra note , at 100-01. 
 There is also strong qualitative evidence of industry dominance in the litigation over the 
EPA’s Clean Water Act technology-based standard-setting rulemakings. See supra note 
104 and accompanying text; see also LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN 
COURT 50-51 (1982) (describing industry’s appeal of EPA’s Clean Water Act discharge 
standards). 
 By contrast, Dr. Wenner’s research on interest group use of the courts in the 1970s and 
1980s to challenge agency rules revealed that environmental groups brought the greatest 
number of cases in the court of appeals in the early 1970s. See id. at 41, 43; Lettie 
McSpadden Wenner, Interest Group Litigation and Environmental Policy, 11 POL’Y STUD. 
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C. The Limits of the Courts 
 
 The data also reveal some stark limits to the courts’ influence 
over agency decision making, regardless of whether the interest 
group oversight is diverse and pluralistic or exclusively 
dominated by industry.298 In the air toxic rules, only a small 
percentage (8%) of the rules were actually appealed to 
judgment.299 This low rate of appeals is reinforced by similar 
findings in several other empirical studies.300 The direct radius of 
the courts’ influence, then, extends over only a small percentage 
of the total set of rules. Although the resulting appeals and court 
opinions set precedent, the fewer the cases, the more limited the 
opportunities for courts to provide meaningful oversight of agency 
rulemakings.  
 The limitations of the courts’ remedial powers are also 
apparent in the air toxic rules. The courts remanded five rules 
from 2000 to 2007, and only one has been repaired.301 Even when 
the EPA’s repromulgation is governed by a consent decree with 
petitioners, the EPA lags well behind schedule.302 The air toxic 
rules may be aberrational in the long period it takes the EPA to 
                                                                                                                 
671, 673-74 (1983). Business then caught up and exceeded environmental appeals by the 
late 1970s, although by what appears to be only a 10 to 20% greater number of appeals 
filed. See Wenner, supra note , at 46, fig.3.2. In terms of success rates on appeal, the two 
groups stayed relatively close to one another. Id. at 51, fig.3.4. It should be noted that Dr. 
Wenner’s data include both the appeal of enforcement cases as well as appellate 
challenges to rules. 
298.Professor Mashaw, apparently in anticipation of a gap between court opinions and 
agency behavior, argues that agency statutory interpretation should be studied as an 
autonomous enterprise, with its own forces, incentives, and methodologies that are often 
wholly independent from the courts. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note , at 900-01 (discussing 
how agencies respond to presidents and thus are likely to take risks to advance 
presidential politics, and concluding that “[a]gencies who never lose in court are probably 
not doing their jobs”). While Professor Mashaw does not directly take up the issue of 
nonacquiescence, his preliminary sketch of agency incentives identifies a number of 
competing reasons that agencies may decide to take litigation risks and underscores the 
inevitable ambiguities that most judicial opinions hold with respect to future agency 
policies. Mashaw, supra note , at 515 (“[G]iven the context of most judicial constructions of 
agency statutes ... it is often unclear what binding force the judicial interpretation was 
meant to have for future policy.”).  
299.See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
300.See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
301.See supra Table 1. 
302.See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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repair rules on remand, although the courts’ more general 
limitations in effectuating their judgments are well known in 
administrative law.303  
 Even the courts’ precedential impact on the EPA’s air toxic 
rule-making project must be qualified because the agency resisted 
following the courts’ instructions on several important 
interpretations in early rulemakings.304 The EPA did not 
explicitly nonacquiesce with respect to this precedent, but it did 
seem to ignore or at least creatively distinguish important 
statutory guidance by courts in cases decided in 2000 and 2001.305 
The EPA also took risks in the creative interpretation of its 
statutory authority that the agency openly acknowledged were 
vulnerable to judicial invalidation, but persevered for reasons 
that appear largely political.306 The possibility that political 
influence can sometimes trump litigation risks is not necessarily 
unprecedented; as Professor Edley notes, “politics is lurking in 
almost every agency decision and in every corner of 
administrative law.”307 Yet if the agencies consider the courts 
only to be one constraint, and a small one at that, then that fact 
calls into question the ability of the courts to deter the agency 
from straying from its mandate, even in cases where the agency’s 
interpretation appears facially at odds with the statute.308 Again, 
seen through this light, the courts’ strongly worded opinions and 
repeat warnings could be read to do no more than fire a few shots 
across the bow of an agency that is otherwise relatively unfazed 
by the courts’ opinions that limit its discretion.  
 One should not overstate the EPA’s willingness to risk 
challenges and adverse judgments from the courts. There are 
                                                 
303.See supra notes 158-59 and 180-92 and accompanying text. 
304.It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that the courts’ environment-leaning 
interpretations in the cases that environmental groups won will advance the public 
interest more than the agency’s vacated interpretations. This assumption is contestable, 
however.  
305.See, e.g., Sierra Club II, 479 F.3d 875, 880-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (chastising EPA for 
ignoring National Lime II, 233 Fed.3d 625, and Cement Kiln, 255 F.3d 855). 
306.See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
307.CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 170 (1990). 
308.Stewart also raises this concern about the effects of judicial review on social 
regulation under the interest group representation model. See Stewart, supra note , at 
1804 (expressing concern that because of the multiple constraints acting on the agency, 
“[t]he amelioration of agency bias wrought by the judicial system may thus be largely 
cosmetic”). 
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ambiguities and even inconsistencies in some of the earlier 
opinions interpreting the air toxic provisions of the Clean Air Act, 
and it is possible that the EPA simply believed in good faith that 
subsequent standard-setting applications presented facts that 
were unique enough to allow it to distinguish these earlier cases. 
Presumably, too, after the court issued a second, firmer opinion 
remanding the rule on a Chevron Step One error, the EPA will 
either follow or distinguish the precedent in a much more 
rigorous way in subsequent rules.309  
 Nevertheless, the evidence does raise questions about the 
extent to which unwelcome court opinions present binding 
constraints on agency action. If it in fact turns out that the courts 
only occasionally influence future agency decision making, then 
the benefits of judicial review may be more limited than initially 
thought and should be set against other costs, such as the 
possibility that the agency may compromise the substance of its 
rules in order to avoid delays and other resource drains 




 This study of EPA’s air toxic rules reveals potentially 
significant problems in the viability of the pluralistic model in 
settings when interest groups have dramatically different 
resources available to participate. At least in the air toxic 
rulemakings, diverse interest group oversight is the exception 
rather than the rule. Moreover, even in the minority of cases 
when a full set of interested parties is engaged in a rulemaking 
                                                 
309.For example, the EPA presumably now believes it simply cannot interpret the statute 
to provide a risk-based exemption to emission limits for major industries. See, e.g., 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The EPA may also 
appreciate that in all HAPs rules it must set limits on listed air toxins, even when the 88% 
best technological process does not control for them and it cannot ignore nonproduction 
bases for limiting emissions. See National Lime II, 233 F.3d 625, 628, 631, 633-34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). If facilities can limit toxic emissions through means that do not involve 
inputs—for example, by pollution prevention—then this entire suite of operational 
approaches is fair game in determining what the best available technologies can 
accomplish. See supra Text Box 1. Thus, there are reasons to believe that the agency now 
views several of the courts’ rulings as hard constraints that apply across all rules and that 
will be honored regardless of who engages individually in those rule-making efforts. Thus, 
there are reasons to believe that the agency now views several of the courts’ rulings as 
hard constraints that apply across all rules and that will be honored regardless of who 
engages individually in those rule-making efforts. 
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and the stakeholderse deploy the courts to review problematic 
rules, the data reveal that the EPA may ignore or at least limit 
the courts’ commands through creative interpretations of the 
precedent. Although the courts’ role in individual cases as 
guardian of public health is uncontestable, on the whole judicial 
review proves less influential than is generally expected. Indeed, 
the net effect of judicial review may well be to provide regulated 
industries with legal leverage that, in the aggregate, actually 
undermines the agency’s ability to act on behalf of the public 
interest.  
 The results of this study also spotlight the need for further 
empirical study of the judicial review of agency rulemakings. The 
current design of administrative process, which relies heavily on 
interest groups to hold the agencies accountable, emerged in the 
1970s at a time when interest group participation was 
considerably more evenly balanced between public interest 
groups and industry participants. If these conditions are no 
longer present, then the ability of some groups to dominate the 
regulatory process at the expense of others deserves additional 
research and may warrant reform. 




General Information on Litigated Air Toxic Rules 
 
This appendix contains all of the basic information on each litigated HAPS rule. 
The data was collected from the case opinions, by citechecking the case to 
identify petitions for rehearing or for cert, and by searching the Federal Register 
Unified Agenda to determine the current status of each remanded rule. 
 
Legend: For “Panel composition” row: R is Republican and D. is Democrat 
For three “won” rows: E is environmental group, I is industry Group. 
 
 
Rule subpart LLL JJJ J QQQ DDDD JJJJJ/KKKK
K 
DDDDD 
Case caption National 
Lime II 










Plywood Brick kiln Boilers 






353 F.3d 976 489 F.3d 
1364 
479 F.3d 875 489 F.3d 
1250 
Court date 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 2007 2007 
Final rule 
date 
1999 2003 2002 2002 2004/06 2003 2004 
Panel comp. 1R/2D 1R/2D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R/1D 2R 






Yes Yes No No Yes Yes for brick 
only (not clay) 
Yes 
President Clinton Crossover Crossover Crossover Bush II Bush II Bush II 
























# issues won  1 (I); 2(E) 1 1 0 2 (E) 5  1 






















Rhg. en banc 
denied 
No No No 


















Interest Group Involvement in Air Toxic Rules (all rules 
and then by litigated rules individually) 
The data on interest group engagement were collected by coding the docket indices 
for each of the HAPs rules.  The data on changes made to the rules were collected 
by coding the changes EPA listed in each final rule that constituted significant 
changes from the proposed rule.  For a fuller description of the methods used to 





























































152 156 0.16 7.8 38 2 5 




135 196 0 1 95 5 8 
J 9 0 0 1 9 0 1 
QQQ 109 15 0 10 22 2 4 
LLL 221 111 1 23 28 4 7 
JJJ 302 153 0 7 36 0 1 
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Changes Made to the Air Toxic Rules (all rules and then by 
litigated rules individually) 
 
 
     
Changes made 
weakening the 



























13.3 2 5.3 10.2 
DDDD 39 3 21 27 
JJJJJ/ 
KKKKK 
10 1 8 13 
J 1 1 2 0 
QQQ 7 2 1 3 
LLL 3 5 10 12 
JJJ 20 0 0 6 




Nature of Issues Decided in Litigation á la Chevron 
This table identifies each of the issues reviewed by the D.C. Circuit in each of the 
HAPs judicial appeals.  The rows of the table are exactly the same as those used by 
Schuck & Elliott, supra note 85, at 1032-33.  The data was collected by coding 
each issue raised in the case.  The table lists each issue in order (#) and identifies 
the page where the court issued its opinion on the issue.  




Ntl Lime II  Ntl Lime II  Arteva  
 
Sierra Club I  Mossville  Sierra Club II  
Case cite 233 F.3d 625  323 F.3d 
1088 
353 F.3d 976 370 F.3d 
1232 
479 F.3d 875 




















  REJ: #1, p.983 (did 
not violate statute 
with PM surrogate 
approach – only 
looked at best – not 




reasonable and so 
is applying step 2 
with deference). 
 REM: #1, p.880; 
(for relation to 
Mossville, see 
p.882); #2. p.882 
(somewhat of a 
hybrid – worst 






p.884 (no basis 









































REJ: #1, p.985; #2, 
p.986; #3, p.987; 
#4-6, pp.988-90 





















      




no basis is 
given 
      
Misc.    REJ: #11, p.992 
(ESA not ripe yet). 
  
Waived    One issue was 
waived, but the 
court actually 
seemed to consider 
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Appendix 3, continued 
Nature of Issues Decided in Litigation a la Chevron, 
Continued 
NRDC (2007) case 
Case caption NRDC NRDC 
Case cite 489 F.3d 1364 489 F.3d 1364 
Petitioner Enviro Industry 






law [Step one] 
#1 low risk ultra vires/end-run, 
p.1371 [note EPA conceded “no 
controls was also violation, so 
court did not rule]; #2 no 
























which no basis 
is given 
  
Miscellaneous 
waived 
  
 
